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Flight Safety Critical Parts (FSCP) are parts that if they fail will 
cause loss of aircraft and possible loss of life.  Each Service within DOD 
has their own practices and procedures for management, acquisition, 
and categorizing of FSCP, e.g., Flight Safety Parts, Flight Safety Critical 
Items, Flight Safety Critical Parts, Critical Safety Items, etc.  Due to the 
diversity between Services, there is significant confusion within DOD and 
private industry regarding the acquisition, management, and disposal of 
FSCP.  Many of the parts identified as FSCP are used on aircraft 
operated by more than one Service and on civilian aircraft.  The Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA) manages parts that are common between 
Services, which include many FSCPs.  Management for FSCP that cross 
component lines, with each Service providing unique specification, is 
very difficult.  Identification, procurement, testing, and management of 
Flight Safety Parts need to be consistent between Services in order to 
provide one standard and one face to industry.  Standardization of 
policies and procedures will increase the potential for the procurement of 
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A. PURPOSE  
Flight Safety Critical Parts (FSCP) are parts that if they fail will 
cause loss of aircraft and possible loss of life.  Each Service within the 
Department of Defense (DOD), i.e., Army, Air Force, and Navy, has a 
different way of looking at and managing FSCP.  The Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA) manages most of the consumable and repair parts for 
DOD, and many FSCP are common among Services.  Each Service 
provides unique criteria and standards for managing FSCP based upon 
mission and operating environment.  The burden on DLA to provide 
FSCP meeting different engineering characteristics is extensive.  The 
purpose of this study is to analyze how each Service within DOD 
manages, i.e., acquires, sustains, disposes, FSCP and to examine/study 
the feasibility of developing standard practices and procedures for the 
acquisition, identification, documentation, and disposal of FSCP within 
DOD.  Suggested title for the research is “An Analysis of the Feasibility 
and Benefits of Standardizing the Management of Flight Safety Critical 
Parts within DOD”. 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
Proper management of FSCP is vital to prevent loss of life and 
property, and to ensure the military mission is accomplished as planned.  
If FSCP are not properly managed, i.e., identified, maintained, and 
tested, they could fail prematurely and any failure could be catastrophic.  
Each Service within DOD has their own unique practices and procedures 
for the management and acquisition of FSCP.  Along with distinct 
practices and procedures, each Service has their own method of 
1 
categorizing FSCP, e.g., Flight Safety Parts, Flight Safety Critical Items, 
Flight Safety Critical Parts, Critical Safety Part, etc.  Due to this diversity 
between Services, there is significant confusion within the Government 
and private industry regarding the acquisition, management, and 
disposal of FSCP. 
 
DLA manages a large portion of the FSCP for DOD.  Many of the 
parts identified as FSCP are used on aircraft operated by more than one 
Service and on civilian aircraft.  Management for FSCP that cross 
component lines is difficult enough without each Service providing 
differing engineering procedures.  In-order-to provide consistent 
management procedures to DLA and avoid providing conflicting 
information to private industry, manufacturer qualification requirements 
and testing procedures for parts designated FSCP need to be 
standardized and controlled. 
 
Life cycle management of FSCP goes beyond manufacturing and 
testing of FSCP.  The policies and procedures for the disposal of FSCP fall 
within the sphere of management and needs to be included in the 
standardized policies and procedures.  The lack of standard 
documentation and loose compliance of disposal policies and procedures 
has resulted in the sale of out of tolerance FSCP to private aircraft 
vendors, and some of these out of tolerance FSCP have been sold back to 
DOD as good parts. 
 
Standardization of policies and procedures will eliminate confusion 
in the acquisition, identification, documentation, and disposal of FSCP.  
Standardization of the acquisition of FSCP within DOD will reduce the 
2 
risk of nonconforming parts1,2 entering the military inventory.  The 
driving forcer for standardization of FSCP within DOD is the reduction of 
the risk of procuring, and releasing3, nonconforming parts that are 
critical to safe flight.  The benefits to keeping parts out of the supply 
system include enhanced safety and reduced sustainment cost.  When 
nonconforming parts enter the inventory, there is the inherent risk of a 
mishap.  Besides the cost of a mishap, there are underlying costs 
associated with identification, tracking, and purging the nonconforming 
parts from the supply system, and fielded aircraft.  With the formation of 
DLA, the military is progressing toward a common DOD supply system.  
Standardization of FSCP will also reduce the cost of management4, 
sustainment, and lifecycle logistics cost. 
 
Standardization will eliminate multiple unique procurement 
requirements5, thus providing a more efficient inventory within DOD.  An 
inventory whose parts are made to one set of standards and 
requirements will produce stable parts, and reduce life-cycle cost.  The 
result of continually changing the manufacturing process to meet varying 
engineering requirements is parts with varying tolerances and/or 
nonconforming parts.  Changing engineering requirements to meet the 
demands of each Service results in expending unnecessary resources, 
time, and personnel, and will increase the probability of procuring 
nonconforming parts. 
 
                                                           
1  Nonconforming parts are parts that do not meet the tolerances or specification of the technical 
documentation or engineering drawings for the part. 
2 Both new parts procured from manufactures of aircraft parts and surplus parts purchased from aircraft 
parts vendors. 
3 Releasing parts to the supply systems to be issued to field units, and the release of aircraft parts to the 
DRMO for release to private industry. 
4 The cost of managing parts includes resources expended, time, and personnel. 
3 
5 Unique procurement requirements are stand alone engineering requirements from each Service based 
upon their individual mission and operating environment. 
This study will be based upon current policies and procedures 
used by each Service.  Information will be gathered through literature 
search of current regulations, attending meetings dealing with flight 
safety issues, and interviewing key personnel who are actively involved in 
FSCP decision making. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What are the commonalities and differences in the procedures 
used by each Service to acquire, identify, qualify, and control FSCP, and 
how can the procedures be standardized to ensure ample control of FSCP 
collectively across all the Services within DOD? 
 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
A.  What is the DOD definition and policy for FSCP, and is this 
policy adequate to ensure safe aircraft parts? 
B.  How do the military Services implement the DOD FSCP policy? 
C.  How do the military Services identify, document, and control 
FSCAP? 
D.  How are FSCP manufacturers qualified and parts tested by 
each Service? 
E.  What procedures are used to retire and dispose of FSCP by 
each Service? 
F.  How does the FAA interface with the FSCAP program? 
G.  What effect will standard DOD FSCP practices and procedures 
have on the FAA? 
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D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
The results of this study will be executable recommendations for 
the management of FSCPs.  This study will be limited to the DOD 
Services, i.e., Army, Air Force, and Navy (Marines are part of the 
Department of the Navy and any unique requirements for the Marines 
will be addressed under the Navy policy), and to the procedures for 
acquisition, classification, documentation, and disposal of FSCP.  This 
study will address coordination and agreements with the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) for the disposal of surplus military aviation 
parts and the impact of nonconforming parts on civil aviation.  This 
study will not include private industry or civilian FSCP requirements nor 
will it include generic maintenance or supply system problems. 
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This research will consist of two methods, a literature search and 
interviews with key personnel.  Literature search will consist of 
researching publications, technical manuals, regulations, directives, and 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for each of the DOD Services.  
Literature search will also consist of General Accounting Office (GAO) 
reports and commercial studies.  In addition, research will consist of 
attending meetings and seminars on flight safety, and interviews with 
key personnel and managers of the different Services.  Interviews will be 
structured to gather empirical data so that the data can be analyzed 
without bias of personal opinion.  Analysis of the findings from the 
literature search, meetings, and personal interviews will be compiled and 
sorted by similarities and differences to establish a matrix to propose a 





1. Chapter I - Introduction 
This chapter will provide an introduction of Flight Safety Critical 
Parts, and provide the basis for this thesis. 
 
2. Chapter II - History 
This chapter will provide a discussion of the events leading to the 
need for a unified procedure for the acquisition, maintenance, and 
disposal of FSCP. 
 
3. Chapter III - Presentation Of Data 
This chapter will document the research on flight safety parts and 
support the analysis and conclusions reached.  This chapter will cover 
management responsibilities of flight safety parts from DOD down to the 
Service level, and cover the entire lifecycle of flight parts.  This chapter 
will start with the basic definition and procurement policy and end with 
the disposal of flight safety parts. 
 
4. Chapter IV - Data Analysis 
This chapter analyses the data presented in Chapter III. 
 
5. Chapter V - Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter will document the conclusions reached, and provide 




G. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This research could lay the groundwork for the standardization of 
procedures for acquisition, identification, documentation, and disposal of 
FSCP within DOD.  DLA manages most repair and consumable parts for 
the Services.  Each Service has unique engineering requirements for the 
procurement of FSCPs, and each Service wants DLA managed FSCP 
procured to their individual requirements.  Standard procedures will 
eliminate conflicting procedures between Services.  It is difficult to 
manage parts and maintain an adequate supply chain with multiple 
conflicting requirements on the same part.  An example of this is if more 
than one Service uses a particular part, then each Service may have 
unique requirements, which are distinctively different, i.e., the Navy may 
require corrosion prevention due to operating in a saltwater environment, 
while the Army may need protection from sand erosion.  The differences 
between operating conditions may require different engineering 
procedures.  When DLA goes to replenish the stock of these parts as they 
are consumed, which requirement do they buy from, or do they buy for 
both requirements and establish a procedure to track the parts based on 
the requirement.  Tracking the different requirements could be difficult if 
one National Stock Number (NSN) is used.  Another benefit of this study 
is the standardization of documentation across DOD.  Standardization of 
documentation will provide a method for accurately tracking parts by 
location and total time across Service lines thus reducing the likelihood 
that an expended FSCP will be returned to the military supply system or 
sold to private industry as a good part.  Life-cycle logistics cost savings 
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II. HISTORY 
Parts critical to the safe operation of aircraft have been around 
since the first aircraft flew in 1903 at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina.  The 
Army recognized parts critical to the safe operation of aircraft in the mid 
1960’s when the use of helicopters escalated in the Viet Nam war.  
During the 1970’s, the Army undertook many engineering initiatives to 
improve reliability and increase the life of aircraft parts.  Engineering 
initiatives that focused on parts critical to safe operation of the aircraft 
evolved into the Prime Manufacturing Critical Parts Program for a limited 
number of parts in sensitive processes.  In 1985, parts critical to safe 
operation of the aircraft were labeled as Flight Safety Parts (FSP). 
 
In 1984, Congress passed the Competition In Contracting Act 
(CICA), which directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to competitively 
procure all its resources in order to provide small and disadvantaged 
businesses access to lucrative defense contracts.  The intent of CICA was 
to stimulate the economy, increase the number of small and 
disadvantaged businesses producing parts for the military, and provide a 
new source of suppliers at a reduced price.  Prior to 1984, the majority of 
aircraft parts were bought from the aircraft manufacturer.  After 1984, 
due to CICA, the Army issued numerous contracts to acquire technical 
documentation from the Prime Manufacturer/Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) in order to build competitive Spare Technical Data 
Packages (STDPs) for the breakout of spare parts; FSP were not included 
in this effort.  The Army developed competitive FSP STDPs in-house and, 
by 1987, the Army started competitive procurement of FSPs.  The Air 
Force and Navy did not breakout FSPs.  They developed Service unique 
Justification and Approval (J&A) documents for the sole source 
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procurement of FSPs.  From 1985-1988, the Army used in-house 
technical documentation and prime contractor sustainment engineering 
to identify and verify critical characteristics in order to develop 
engineering testing requirements, i.e., fatigue, endurance, and 
interchangeability for FSPs.  In 1990, the procurement of spare parts to 
support Desert Shield/Storm was accelerated and by necessity Army 
FSPs were procured from untested sources.  Along with this huge influx 
of parts to support the Gulf Crisis, the Army inventory acquired 
numerous suspect parts. 
 
Indiana Gear Works (IGW) Inc. is a typical example of problems 
that can occur with parts purchased from an untested source.  From 
1986 through 1989, the Army bought Apache main transmission gears 
from IGW Inc.  The gears were not properly hardened in the 
manufacturing process.  Over the three-year period, there were 
numerous Quality Deficiency Reports (QDRs) written against the main 
transmission.  An engineering investigation of the QDRs revealed the 
fault to be improperly hardened gears.  As Apache main transmissions 
with IGW gears were overhauled, IGW gears were replaced and removed 
from the supply system. 
 
In the spring of 1985, there were two Class A mishaps resulting in 
total loss of a UH-60 and a CH-47 aircraft.  In both cases, the accident 
investigations determined prime manufacturer material defects were the 
cause of the mishaps.  As a result of the accident investigation findings 
in 1985, the Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) directed testing of 




In-service Parts (Surveillance) Testing is the testing and evaluation 
of used FSP in the inventory, i.e., parts in depot overhaul lines, depot 
stock, and parts on fielded aircraft.  The FSP are selected for surveillance 
testing on the basis of lifetime limits/Time Before Overhaul (TBO), 
operational mission/environment, and configuration.  The types of 
testing performed were fatigue, endurance and interchangeability, 
analytical tear down, and non-destructive evaluation. 
 
Life cycle documentation control includes identification of FSPs 
and their critical characteristics in technical information, drawing 
revisions, technical data package enhancement, and field/depot 
maintenance manuals. 
 
Throughout history, there have been disasters that were the direct 
result of a critical part or application failure.  Although the following 
examples are not directly related to aviation, they depict the results of 
poor quality in either materiel or installation, which is at the heart of the 
FSP program.  Over looking critical characteristics can be disastrous.  In 
1905, the boiler on the USS Bennington, a U.S. Navy Gunship, exploded 
killing 62 people.  The USS Bennington exploded due to a faulty safety 
valve.  There is no record or direct evidence that the safety-valves on the 
USS Bennington had been tested in accordance with (IAW) Navy 
Regulations. [Ref. 2:USS Bennington]  On 11 April 1912, the Titanic sank 
after hitting an iceberg, 1522 people, passengers and crew, were lost at 
sea.  When the Titanic struck the iceberg, the steel plates in the hull 
cracked like glass due to improper hardening of the steel. [Ref. 2:Titanic]  
In 1963, the USS Thresher, a U.S. Navy Submarine, sank killing the crew 
of 129 along with the overhaul engineering staff.  The USS Thresher sank 
due to a water line break in the main engine room.  After the water line 
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broke, the surrounding bulkheads cracked due to faulty welding 
performed during a recent overhaul.  Investigation determined that 
existing standards at the time were not followed throughout the overhaul 
to ensure safe operation of the submarine. [Ref. 2:USS Thresher]  In 
1987, the Space Shuttle USS Challenger exploded 73 seconds after 
launch, killing the crew of seven.  A faulty O-ring in the solid fuel rocket 
booster was identified as the principal problem.  The  "O" ring design was 
unacceptably sensitive to a number of factors. These factors were the 
effects of temperature, physical dimensions, characteristics of the 
materials, effects of reusability, processing, and reaction of the joint to 
dynamic loading.” [Ref. 3:p 41-68]  The booster joint and "O" ring design 
were not robust enough to compensate for the managerial decision to 
launch the shuttle outside of its operational temperature envelope (the 
air temperature was near freezing on an "atypical Florida day", not an 
anticipated design criteria).” [Ref. 3: p. 41-68] 
 
In September 1988, Congress passed Public Law 100-456 (10USC 
Sec 2382)  "Procurement of critical aircraft and ship spare parts: quality 
control.”  Public Law 104-106 repealed 10USC Sec 2382 in October 
1994.  Public Law 100-456 directed the Secretary of Defense to enforce 
standards of quality control in the procurement of all critical aircraft and 
ship spare or repair parts.  The House Bill contained a provision (sec 
808) that would require the Secretary of Defense to procure critical spare 
or repair parts for ships and aircraft that meet the same quality and 
inspection requirements as the original parts. [Ref. 4:p 2555]  The Senate 
amendment contained a provision (sec 822) that would require the 
Secretary of Defense to use, in procuring critical spare or repair part for 
aircraft, qualification requirements that were at least as stringent as 
those that applied to the original or original redesigned parts. [Ref 4:p 
2555]  The House and Senate compromised to produce an amendment 
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with broad implications and one in which CICA still applied.  The final 
amendment required the head of an agency, when purchasing critical 
spare parts or repair parts, to use all appropriate qualification and 
quality requirements as may be specified and made available to potential 
offerors. [Ref 4:p 2555].  The House and Senate both wanted to restrict 
FSP to the same standards as Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
parts.  In keeping with the intent of CICA, and not eliminating 
competition, the House and Senate compromised on the broad wording 
for the law.  The broad wording of the law put the responsibility of 
implementation on DOD.  The challenge for DOD was to implement the 
law without violating the intent of CICA.  Based upon final wording of the 
bill, each Service developed implementation instructions for the 
processing and handling of FSP.  Each Service’s implementation plan 
was unique and was based on the Service’s culture and way of doing 
business.  There are differences in the culture, philosophy, engineering 
procedures, and business rules for the three Services.  The Army 
operates in a variety of field environments from dry hot desert to hot 
humid rainforest to arctic conditions.  The Navy operates on aircraft 
carriers, in a saltwater environment, and must land and stop within the 
distance of a football field.  The Air Force operates from fixed bases with 
mile long landing strips.  Based on the loose wording of PL 100-456 and 
the distinct cultures of the three Services, there are three different 
philosophies for managing FSP.  The Army maintained its FSP policy and 
embraced CICA with an obsessive desire to obtain breakout goals.  The 
Air Force and Navy developed several categories of FSP, Flight Safety 
Critical Parts (FSCP) being the most stringent.  The Air Force and Navy 
wrote a class action waiver to exempt themselves from the requirements 
of CICA for FSCP. 
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The National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1996, Title 
VIII: Acquisition Policy, Acquisition Management, and Related Matters – 
Subtitle A: Acquisition Reform; Sec 803 “Control in Procurements of 
Critical Aircraft and Ship Parts” repealed Section 2383 of Title 10, United 
States Code (PL 100-456). [Ref. 5]   The National Defense Authorization 
Act For Fiscal Year 1996 became PL 104-106 on 10 Feb 1996.  The 
repeal of PL 100-456 was part of the on going acquisition reform 
initiative to reduce the use of Government specifications and standards.  
The PL 104-106 removed the mandatory enforcement of quality 
standards, but there were no changes in the current practices or 
procedures specified; therefore, there were no noticeable changes in the 
philosophy of the management of FSP.  The Navy Alternate Source 
Qualification (ASQ) Desktop Guide, 7 Apr 99, still references PL 100-456 
as a requirement to purchase FSP to the same quality standards as the 
OEM. 
 
In 1988, problems with the Army breakout program began to 
surface.  One example of a breakout problem was in 1988 when it was 
discovered that a UH-60 parts breakout contractor was producing 
substandard parts.  An investigation of the cause revealed that the 
Technical Data Package (TDP) used in the solicitation and contract did 
not produce the same part that was produced by the OEM.  The original 
part experienced several years of fine-tuning and minuscule adjustments 
to the manufacturing process, which was not captured in the Technical 
Data Package.  Constant adjustments to the manufacturing process by 
the OEM produced a superior part.  Although still within the parameters 
of the drawings, the part was substantially different from one that was 
manufactured solely from the information contained in the TDP. 
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The Army began testing and qualifying manufacturers and vendors 
for new sources of FSP on a limited basis in 1989.  New source testing 
was established to verify that parts from all sources meet the critical 
characteristic6 requirements of the FSP.  Due to the success of the 
program, a full-up program was initiated in 1993.  To qualify new FSP 
sources, the Army uses the OEM, commercial testing houses, or DOD 
laboratories to perform qualification testing on parts.  Parts not meeting 
testing requirements are not used. 
 
One problem encountered by the Army when qualifying new 
sources was quality standards among manufacturers were not standard.  
Prime contractors had a quality program, but breakout vendors had 
minimal quality standards and none of them used the same quality 
procedures.  In order to standardize quality procedures and 
institutionalize quality standards for FSPs, Quality Engineering Standard 
1 (QE Std 1) was developed in 1989 for the manufacturing of new flight 
safety parts.  QE Std 1 applies to all breakout buys with parts that have 
manufacturing critical characteristics and is a mandatory contractual 
requirement for breakout manufactures, contractors, and sub-
contractors.  Critical processes performed during maintenance, overhaul, 
and repair of FSP are just as critical and important as new 
manufacturing.  Quality Engineering Standard 1 does not apply to 
Maintenance and Overhaul (M&O) procedures.  
 
                                                           
6 Critical Characteristic. Any feature throughout the life cycle of a FSCAP, such as dimension, tolerance, 
finish, material or assembly, manufacturing or inspection process, operation, field maintenance, or depot 
overhaul requirement that if non conforming, missing, or degraded may cause the failure or malfunction of 
the FSCAP. [Ref. 6:a 16.41.1] 
Manufacturing Critical Characteristics. Critical characteristics produced during the manufacturing 
process. [Ref. 6:a 16.41.2] 
Installation Critical Characteristics. Critical characteristics that are not introduced during the 




In the early 90s, there was limited surveillance of contractors 
performing maintenance, overhaul, and repair on FSP.  As the number of 
FSP repaired by contractors began to increase, the need for an M&O 
quality standard became evident.  The quality requirements of FSP M&O 
contractors were consistent with the quality requirements of 
manufactures of new FSP.  As the FSP program evolved, Quality 
Engineering Standard 1 was applied to M&O contractors.  In applying QE 
Std 1 to M&O contracts, it became apparent that M&O practices and 
procedures were incompatible with manufacturing process and needed a 
separate unique quality standard.   In 1991, Quality Engineering 
Standard 2 (QE Std 2) was developed for M&O contracts.  QE Std 2 is 
applicable to all M&O repair procedures for FSP with depot7 critical 
characteristics, and applies to all contractors8 and repair facilities that 
perform maintenance on FSP. 
 
In 1992, the FAA9 investigated the crash of a civilian airliner.  The 
accident investigation revealed used Air Force T-39 aircraft parts had 
been sold to private industry and were installed on the civilian airliner. 
[Ref. 10]  After this incident the FAA has found instances where DOD 
aircraft parts, sold as scrap, illegally reentered the civil aviation market 
as usable. [Ref. 8:p 3] 
 
Due to technological advances and the similarity of aircraft, some 
military aircraft parts can be used on commercial aircraft.  Parts that are 
interchangeable between military aircraft and commercial aircraft are 
considered commercial-type parts10.  The FAA considers DOD 
                                                           
7 i.e, Manufacturing and Installation critical characteristics. 
8 Both government and private activities. 
9 The FAA was created as an agency under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to provide for regulation and 
promotion of civil aviation in such a manner as to best foster its development and safety, and provide for 
the safe and efficient use of the airspace by both civil and military aircraft an for other purposes. [Ref. 11] 
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10 Commercial-type parts have application to aircraft used in civil aviation. [Ref. 8:p 2] 
commercial-type parts to be dual use parts 11 when the supplier is also 
Production Approval Holder (PAH) approved by the FAA.  The Federal 
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (PL 81-152), as 
amended, requires DOD to dispose of surplus property; however, DOD is 
prevented from destroying property with economic value.  Consequently, 
since the end of World War II various U.S. manufactured DOD surplus 
military aircraft and parts have been available for sale to the civil sector. 
[Ref. 7:p 3]  Since the implementation of PL 81-152 the disposal of 
surplus aircraft parts has evolved into a complex disposal system that is 
characterized by massive volumes of excess property.  DOD’s primary 
disposal objective is to maximize the reuse of surplus property within the 
military Services, various Government agencies, and authorized donees 
before offering the property for sale to the general public.  Despite this 
goal, DOD actually sells most of its surplus property to the general 
public. [Ref. 8:p 3]  All parts used in civil aviation are required to be 
certified by the FAA12.  While many military parts are commercial-type 
parts, they are not generally FAA certified because DOD specifies 
requirements for the design, production, and acquisition of parts used on 
military aircraft that may be inconsistent with FAA specifications.  Many 
DOD commercial-type parts have the potential to be retroactively 
certified once the parts have been determined to conform to the FAA-
approved design and manufacturing processes. [Ref 8:p 2] 
 
Historical data are required to gain FAA certification of surplus 
aircraft parts.  When surplus aircraft parts are sent to the Defense 
Reutilization Management Office (DRMO) historical data are often 
                                                           
11 Dual Use Product/Part. Any product or part manufactured for civil application by PAH authorized by the 
FAA, which is also procured under U. S. military contract. The product or part has the identical part 
number and configuration as its civil counterpart; it was manufactured using the same FAA-approved 
design, materials, and manufacturing processes. These could also include any product (or part thereof) 
originally produced for the military, which currently holds a normal, utility, acrobatic, or transport type 
certificate (TC) issued under section 21.27. [Ref. 7:p 2] 
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12 The design for the part and the manufacturer’s production process met FAA’s approval 
misplaced, or is never received with the part13. [Ref. 8:p 20]  From 
January 1993 through December 1994, the GAO studied how DOD 
markets and sells surplus and scrap aircraft parts to the general public. 
[Ref. 8:p 1]  The GAO found in spite of incomplete or missing 
documentation, parts that exceeded their life expectancy or those out of 
tolerance were sold in the same batch and under the same conditions as 
new or serviceable parts.  The GAO also found that some aircraft parts 
dealers and vendors who bought excess military parts would refurbish 
and clean up the scrap parts and sell them as usable aircraft parts14,15.  
 
The GAO found unlike some progressive commercial companies, 
DOD does not have the procedures to prevent the improper use of scrap 
once it is sold.  Also, DOD does not mutilate or destroy many of the 
flight-critical scrap parts that it sells and does not require the buyer to 
warrant or certify that all scrap purchased will be used only as such. 
[Ref. 8:p 3].  The GAO also found that the DOD disposal staff is not 
required to identify parts that are FAA certified or have the potential to 
be retroactively certified by the buyer.  DOD disposal staff leaves it up to 
the buyer to determine whether a part is certified or can be made so 
retroactively. [Ref 8:p 8] 
 
Due to the 1993 - 1994 GAO study16, concerns internal to DOD for 
the appropriateness of sale and condition of items at the time of sale rose 
with the publication of the new DOD regulation 4140.1R, DOD materiel 
Management Regulation.  Because of these concerns, Deputy Under 
                                                           
13 Timed out parts are required to be mutilated per policy, TM 738-751. 
14 Usable aircraft parts are those that have value greater than their basic material content and have potential 
to be used for the originally intended purpose. [Ref. 8:p 1] 
15 According to officials from FAA and the Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General, 
financial motives can lead unscrupulous individuals to illegally refurbish or clean up DOD scrap aircraft 
parts and pass them off in the civil aviation market as usable. [Ref. 8:p 12] 
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16 The 1993 GAO study resulted in GAO report, Commercial Practices-Opportunities Exist to Enhance 
DOD’s Sales of Surplus Aircraft Parts, Report number GAO/NSIAD-94-189, September 1994. 
Secretary of Defense (Logistics) convened a meeting hosted by DLA on 13 
September 1994. 
 
As a result of the Disposal Meeting of 13 September 1994, the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics) formed a Process Action 
Team (PAT) to be co-chaired by DOD and the FAA to study Flight Safety 
Critical Aircraft Parts (FSCAP).  The FSCAP PAT was formally charted 
and began work 7 December 1994.  The FSCAP PAT by charter reviewed 
the following: 
1. Process for identification of dual use FSCAP. 
2. Appropriate documentation required to accompany all FSP at 
time of disposal/sale from DOD inventory. 
3. Coding structure necessary to ensure that parts lacking 
appropriate documentation, because of configuration or condition, are 
identified and mutilated prior to disposal. 
4. Method of ensuring interservice and interagency sharing of 
information relevant to sale of parts. 
5. Method to require recipients as a condition of transfer, donation, 
or sale of subject FSCAP to inspect, repair, and/or overhaul the FSCAP 
to FAA requirements prior to subsequent transfer. [Ref. 9:p 1] 
 
The charter of the FSCAP PAT appears to be all encompassing; 
however, the PAT did not cover the life cycle management of FSP.  The 
FSCAP PAT did not cover the procurement and upfront engineering 
required to obtain high quality FSP.  The FSCAP PAT concentrated on 
disposal of FSP and increasing the revenue from the sale of FSP.  Due to 
political pressure, a good deal of the PAT’s effort was consumed with 
defining required historical data and sources available for historical data 
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reconstruction.  The FSCAP PAT recommended that FSCAP that exceed 
their life expectancy, or do not have proper historical documentation 
must be mutilated, and that a section be added to DOD 4140.1R to 
implement a DOD FSCAP program. 
 
In July 1995, DOD initiated a department wide Flight Safety 
Critical Aircraft Parts Program to identify and destroy surplus parts that 
could cause an aircraft to crash if the parts failed during a flight.  The 
goal of the program is to prevent potentially dangerous parts form being 
sold by the DRMOs. [Ref. 1:p 3] 
 
Due to the GAO study, the sale of surplus aircraft parts, and the 
potential sale of unserviceable parts as serviceable, received a lot of 
visibility.  On June 25, 1993, the Commandant of the United States 
Coast Guard directed that a one-time inspection of all inventories of 
FSCAP be performed.  He also directed the installation of appropriate 
recurrent procedures to guard against future acquisition of “bogus 
parts.” [Ref. 12:p 12] 
 
In 1993, the U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) 
implemented a policy for FSP, requiring purchase from OEM only.  After 
3 months, the policy was rescinded due to numerous GAO protest from 
potential bidders that were excluded from bidding on FSP. [Ref. 13] 
 
In January 1996, ATCOM developed and coordinated with the 
Department of the Army (DA) a FSP policy that was CICA friendly.  The 
new Army FSP policy stated; 
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The Army’s policy is to acquire high quality, proven, reliable, 
and safe flight safety parts.  Flight safety parts which require 
engineering testing (Fatigue, Endurance, Interchangeability) 
shall be procured only from sources whose part has met 
engineering test requirements. [Ref. 21] 
 
Each Service has established rules for the qualification of 
manufacturers and vendors of FSP.  In 1997, the Army instituted the 
Supplier Interface and Oversight Program (SIOP) and Flight Safety Parts 
Program.  Through these processes the Army continuously performs 
surveillance visits and quality inspections of contractors’ facilities, 
routinely monitors contractor performance, and performs conformance 
inspections and audits.  This process reviews frozen process planning, 
assures compliance with FSP program requirements, documents findings 
and issues, and establishes dialog with manufacturers regarding FSP 
program and program requirements.  The Navy has a 3-year rule, if a 
vendor has not produced a part in 3 years, they must be requalified.  The 
Air Force has several layers of FSP, i.e., Flight Safety Critical (FSC), 
Durability Critical Part (DCP), Critical Application Item (CAI) with FSC 
being the most critical, and CAI the least critical.  Air Force approval for 
qualification of manufacturers and vendors is limited to: 2 years for FSC, 
3 years for DCP, and 5 years for CAI.  The Defense Standardization 
Program requires validation of qualified sources every 2 years. 
 
During the 1980s, Congress was becoming concerned about the 
growing U.S. budget.  The workforce was getting older and there was a 
bow wave of baby boomers becoming eligible for retirement.  Analysis 
and studies of the aging workforce and the effect of a large number of 
workers eligible for retirement encouraged Congress to start looking for 
ways to decrease the burden the increasing number of retirees would put 
on the already stressed U.S. financial system.  In order to reduce the 
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financial burden, Congress started looking for ways to streamline the 
Government and reduce duplication of effort.  In the 1980s, a number of 
bases were closed and Government agencies combined to eliminate 
duplication and decrease the number of personnel in the Government.  
Each Service within DOD managed parts for their weapon systems.  
There were a lot of parts that were common across the Services.  As part 
of the elimination of duplication effort, DOD was directed to transfer all 
consumable items to DLA for management.  The transfer of parts was 
performed in two phases, Consumable Item Transfer (CIT) I from 1991 – 
1995, and CIT II from 1996- 1997.  The overall responsibility for weapon 
systems readiness was a shared responsibility among the DLA Inventory 
Control Points (ICPs), Army/Navy/Air Force Primary Inventory Control 
Activities (PICAs), and military Services' engineering activities.  This 
arrangement has increased the potential for miscommunication that 
results in bogus parts being procured.  Due to the CIT DLA is now the 
PICA for procuring repair and consumable parts for DOD.  DLA does not 
have the engineering authority, staff, or expertise required to maintain 
the technical data packages17 for weapon systems items.  Therefore, 
engineering responsibility for items used on aircraft and aircraft weapon 
systems has been retained by the responsible Service and its Engineering 
Support Activities (ESAs).  Each Service has different business rules and 
engineering rules for managing their parts.  It is difficult to manage parts 
and maintain an adequate supply chain with multiple conflicting 
requirements on the same part.  When DLA buys new FSP, they review 
the Standard Automated Materiel Management System (SAMMS).  If the 
SAMMS does not have the current Technical Data Package or 
configuration of the part, DLA ICPs send an Engineering Support 
Request DLA Form 339 to Service ESAs in order to obtain the current 
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17 Technical data packages IAW Mil-Dtl-31000 would be a very precise method to convey the data from 
the Service Engineering Support Activity (ESA) to the DLA Inventory Control Points (ICPs). The Army 
already documents its engineering requirement in document called "Spares, Technical Data Package". 
technical data package and qualified suppliers18.  The management of 
FSP using three different engineering rules is a real problem that DLA is 
forced to deal with.  DLA’s rule of thumb is to use the most restrictive 
requirement as delineated by the operational mode summary and 
mission profile for the weapon systems using that item.  In order to 
resolve this dilemma of miscommunication, the Services and DLA need a 
common set of definitions, standard engineering procedures for 
qualifying FSP, and most of all a standard method to communicate19 the 
engineering requirements20 to DLA PICAs and other PICA21. 
 
The control and management of FSP also affects the commercial 
sector.  The Drug Enforcement Agency, other U.S. Government agencies, 
and foreign military sales customers use the OV-10, which is no longer 
in the Navy inventory.  For continued support of the aircraft, DLA still 
buys parts and the Navy still provides engineering support and 
maintains/controls FSP critical characteristic. 
 
On 8 March 2000, Representative Bill McCollum introduced H.R. 
3862, Aircraft Safety Act of 2000.  The “Aircraft Safety Act of 2000 – 
Amends the Federal criminal code to prohibit, and set penalties for, 
knowingly and with intent to defraud, in or affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce:  
                                                           
18 The Defense Standardization Program (DSP) acknowledges that qualification is more than the DSP 
qualification program for Defense Specifications.  The DSP qualification program already embarrasses 
qualification for federal spec and non-government standards, however the DSP has yet to include 
qualification in the form of source control and source approval within its documentation process. 
19 The supply and contracting functions must maintain close communication with the Service's engineering 
sustainment and cognizant design engineer.  Communication among these functional team members is 
essential. DMRD-926 mandated all "DATA" be supplied by the Services to DLA for transferred items. 
20 Technical data packages IAW Mil-Dtl-31000 would be a very precise method to convey the data from 
the Service ESAs to the DLA ICPs.  The Army already documents its engineering requirement in document 
called "Spares, Technical Data Package". 
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21 For each weapon system, PICA responsibility is shared among all Services and DLA.  
(1) Falsifying or concealing a material fact, making any materially 
fraudulent representation, or making or using any materially false 
writing, entry, certification, document, record, data plate, label, or 
electronic communication concerning any aircraft or space vehicle part;  
(2) Exporting from or importing or introducing into the United 
States, selling, trading, installing on or in any aircraft or space vehicle 
any part using or by means of a fraudulent representation, document, 
record, clarification, depiction, data plate, label or electronic 
communication; or  
(3) Attempting to, or conspiring to commit any such offense.” [Ref. 
14] 
On 27 March 2000, the Aircraft Safety Act was referred to the 
House Subcommittee on Crime.  As of 1 June 2001, the bill was pending 
final resolution.  Prior to the introduction of the Aircraft Safety Act of 
2000 there was no real penalty for destroying or altering the 
documentation on aircraft FSPs and selling bogus aircraft FSP as good 
reliable parts.  The Aircraft Safety Act of 2000 provides the needed teeth 
to the FAA and other law enforcement agencies to enforce the 
documentation requirement for FSP. 
 
Throughout the history of military aviation, there have been key 
events that increased the risk of inferior parts being installed on military 
aircraft:  
• The Competition In Contracting Act of 1984  
• The transfer of consumable parts from the Services to DLA in 
1991 under DMRD-926 
• Acquisition Reform, and  
• Specs and Standards Reform.   
24 
 Before CICA (prior to 1984), most aircraft parts were bought from 
the aircraft manufacture.  After CICA, there was a large influx of 
manufacturers and vendors for aircraft parts.  Some of the parts 
produced by the vendors were not up to the same standards as the 
original part.  In 1989, the Army began testing and qualifying 
manufacturers and vendors for new sources of FSP.  New source testing 
was established to verify that parts from all sources meet the critical 
characteristic requirements of the FSP.  From 1993 to 2000, the military 
has invested $73 Million to qualify/re-qualify sources22 of FSP. 
 
Acquisition Reform (of the 5000 series) created administrative and 
management policy that perceptively23 banned engineering practices in 
the form of Military Specifications (MilSpecs) and Military Standards 
(MilStds).  In the early 1990's, management, financial, contracting and 
engineering practices and procedures were defined in directives, Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM) process, Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) and MilStds.  MilStds that standardized the quality engineering 
practices to the entire acquisition and logistics community supplemented 
the 1990 version of DODI 5000.2.  Today quality-engineering practices24 
                                                           
22  "Qualification" 10 USC Sec. 2319. Encouragement of new competitors (a.k.a. CICA) 
"(a)  In this section, the term ''qualification requirement'' means a requirement for testing or other quality 
assurance demonstration that must be completed by an offeror before award of a contract."  Qualification in 
this context includes source control, source approval and qualification (QPL) AMSC of B, C, and T.  The 
DSP does not include source control and source approval ("B" or "C") as qualification mechanisms within 
the purview of the Defense Standardization Program.  The DSP only acknowledges qualification 
requirement within its own defense specifications (MilSpecs).  Thus no public document is available to 
identify qualified Source Control / Approval sources. [Ref. 15] 
23 Reality: Acquisition Reform discouraged the application of prescriptive management and manufacturing 
process standards and required waivers to use such standards, whether they are military, federal, or non-
government.  Today, there are:  
433 military standard practices (none of which require a waiver),  
31 military design criteria standards (waiver required),  
112 interface standards (no waiver required),  
10 military manufacturing standards (waiver required),  
57 military test method standards (waiver required), and  
101 of the old MilStds (waiver required).  
25 
24 Navy nuclear requirements were exempted from Acquisition Reform . 
must be found in other than DOD MilStds25.  Substitute documents in 
the form of Military Handbooks (MilHdbks) provide only fundamental 
principles that would have to be re-written, by functional experts, into 
standards to be inserted in to Major Defense Acquisition Program’s 
(MDAP) Mission Need Statement (MNS)/ Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD) / Statement Of Objectives (SOO) /Statement of Work 
(SOW) / Specifications. 
 
The Specs and Standards Reform has resulted in the cancellation26 
of many MilSpecs and MilStds [Ref. 17].  The Military Departments and 
Defense Agencies have accomplished the Herculean task of reviewing and 
taking action on more than 29,000 military specifications and standards.  
The results:  
• 9600 documents canceled, including 3500 that were 
replaced by non-government standards, performance 
specifications, commercial item descriptions, and guidance 
handbooks. 
• 8100 documents were inactivated for new design and will be 
used only to support legacy systems and equipment. 
• Essentially, all that remains of the document improvement 
effort is a few hundred military specifications and standards 
                                                           
25 A notable exception is Mil-Std-882D, System Safety.  Although much of the specific requirements has 
been moved to a non-mandatory appendix, DoD 5000.2R euphemistically directs the PM to use and require 
the contractor to use industry and DOD standard practice for system safety, consistent with mission 
requirements. 
Safety and Health - The PM shall identify and evaluate safety and health hazards, define risk levels, and 
establish a program that manages the probability and severity of all hazards associated with development, 
use, and disposal of the system. The PM shall use and require contractors to use the industry and DoD 
standard practice for system safety, consistent with mission requirements. This standard practice manages 
risks encountered in the acquisition life cycle of systems, subsystems, equipment, and facilities. These risks 
include conditions that create significant risks of death, injury, acute/chronic illness, disability, and/or 
reduced job performance of personnel who produce, test, operate, maintain, support, or dispose of the 
system. [Ref. 16:para 5.2.10.3] 
 
26 
26 Twenty-eight (28%) percent of the DODISS MilSpec are detailed specifications. 
that may be replaced in the future if suitable non-
government standards can be developed. [Ref. 18] 
 
Application of MilSpecs is at the risk of the user, i.e., the weapon 
systems ESA or Special Projects Office (SPO) for FSCP.  Special studies 
have related as many as 50% of a weapon system's parts to MilSpecs. 
Therefore, reform performance MilSpec Revision B may not be a drop-in 
replacement for the former design MilSpec Revision A. Thus, the ESA, as 
the application engineer, must do a side-by-side crosswalk matrix of the 
requirements in Rev A to the requirements in Rev B, and make his own 
decision as to the appropriateness of a reformed MilSpec as a drop-in 
replacement for each weapon system. The elimination of qualification 
requirements from some MilSpecs27 have resulted in some FSCP and 
Flight Safety Standard Parts being procured from unapproved 
sources/unqualified sources.  MilStds have been the source documents 
for quality engineering practices that have been used in administrative 
regulations to define quality-engineering practices, e.g., Army Regulation 
750-1 dated Aug 1994 used MilStds to define the Army's "Component 
Safety Program". 
 
The transfer of Engineering Defense Standardization Preparing 
Activity responsibility for defense specifications from the Army, Air Force, 
and Navy to DLA has resulted in breaking of the informal liaisons 
between the MilSpec preparing activity and weapon system cognizant 
design activity engineers.  Funding and engineering support staff 
                                                           
27 The Defense Standardization Program qualification policy was to intended to ensure compliance with 
DSP qualification procedures. The qualification requirements were deleted from specifications when there 
were zero (0) qualified sources or there was insufficient justification to retain qualification.   
27 
Deleting the qualification requirement changed the acquisition strategy from the restrictive "T" to open 
competition of "G". For FSCAP items this change understates the minimum acceptable requirements for 
the item, thus supplementation of the MilSpec is required in order to re-establish the minimum quality level 
for critical safety aircraft parts. 
remains a challenge.  Relationships between MilSpecs and NSNs to 
supported weapon system, for the most part, are not an automated 
capability.  The MilSpec to NSN Automated information System (AIS) 
entity relationship does not exist at the DoDISS28 and SAMMS /Total 
Item Record (TIR) levels.  The Defenses Standardization Program (DSP) is 
not able to relate its documents (MilSpecs) to the NSNs, via an AIS 
primary key to foreign keys.  Furthermore, when ESAs have not listed 
their interest in the DSP ASSIST-On-Line database, the MilSpec 
preparing activities have no way to know with whom to coordinate 
document revisions that involve items being used on weapon systems 
under the purview of the application engineers at the ESA or SPO.  This 
communication link is left to the Service's DSP custodian.  Consequently, 
the DSP Office has formed an IPT to improve the DSP coordinating 
process to meet the needs of a wider community. [Ref. 19]  Aircraft 
programs must trade-off price, performance, schedule, and risk.  As 
pressure increases on performance and price, greater levels of risk are 
allocated to sustainment engineering and readiness support needs 
required in the out years, e.g., the contractor logistics support concept 
for the B-2 has expired, therefore sustainment support of this low-
density aircraft will become the responsibility of the Air Force.  
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28 DoD Index of Specification and Standards (DODISS) a.k.a. Web Site "Assist-On-Line" 
III. PRESENTATION OF DATA 
This chapter will document the research on flight safety parts and 
support the analysis, and conclusions reached.  This chapter will cover 
management responsibilities of flight safety parts from DOD down to the 
Service level, and discuss how the FAA, Coast Guard and DLA interface 
with DOD.  This chapter will cover the entire lifecycle of flight Safety 
Critical parts (FSCP) starting with the basic definition and procurement 
policy and end with the disposal of FSCAP. 
 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Commander In 
Chiefs (CINCs) of the unified commands, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and the Services, i.e., Department of the Army, 
Department of the Air Force, and the Department of the Navy make-up 
the core of the Department of Defense.  The Office of the Secretary of 
Defense helps the Secretary plan, advise and carry out the nation’s 
security policies as directed by the National Command Authority.  The 
National Command Authority is a term used to collectively describe the 
President and the Secretary of Defense.  The Office of the Secretary of 
Defense carries out the Secretaries guidance by tasking the military 
departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified 
commands.  The Secretary of Defense has four key “under secretaries” to 
assist in the critical areas of policy (Under Secretary Defense (USD) for 
Policy), finance (USD Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer), force 
readiness (USD for Personnel and Readiness) and Purchasing (USD for 
Acquisition, technology and Logistics (AT&L)).  Figure 1 shows the DOD 
organizational structure and the relationship of the Services with DLA, 
FAA, and Coast Guard. 
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Figure 1.   DOD Organizational Structure [From: Ref. 39] 
 
The logistics communication channels differ from the 
organizational command structure.  The USD AT&L establishes and 
directs the procurement and Logistics policy for DOD.  The Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA) is a DOD agency that has equal status with the 
Services.  DLA provides supply support, contract management, technical, 
and logistics services to the military Services, DOD agencies, federal civil 
agencies, and select foreign governments. [Ref. 20:p 3]  Each Service has 
an office with responsibility for Acquisition Technology and Logistics 
(Army – Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (DCSLOG), Air Force – 
Commander, Air Force Materiel Command, Navy – Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition) which interfaces 
and is governed by the policies set forth by the USD AT&L.  The Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Coast Guard are part of the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) and are not governed by the USD 
AT&L.  However, the FAA interfaces with the Services, DLA, and the USD 
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AT&L in the disposal and sale of surplus FSCAP to the civil and 
commercial aviation markets.  The Coast Guard is also affected by the 
sale and disposal of surplus FSCP.  Both the FAA and Coast Guard are 
users of surplus FSCAP and participant in the Federal Logistics 
Information System (FLIS)29. 
 
A. WHAT IS THE DOD DEFINITION AND POLICY FOR FSCP? 
DOD uses a variety of terms associated with FSCP. [Ref. 24:s 5]  
Not only does each Service have it's own terms, definitions, and rules, 
but product families e.g., propulsion, also have their own unique terms.  
Figure 2 shows most of the terms used by the Services to describe 













































Figure 2.   Terminology  [From: Ref. 24] 
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29 FLIS – The centralized automated repository for all national stock numbers and associated item-related 
data assigned to items of supply used by the Federal Government. 
DOD does not have a common definition, or policy for Flight Safety 
Critical Parts (FSCP), however, there is a common definition, and policy 
for Flight Safety Critical Aircraft Parts (FSCAP). 
 
The USD of AT&L is the proponent for DOD 4140.1R, Materiel 
Management Regulation (a.k.a. the super reg.).  DOD 4140.1R contains 
the definition and policy for FSCAP, but does not address FSCP.  FSCP 
versus FSCAP, this may be splitting hairs, however, there is a definite 
distinction between the two when dealing with the acquisition of flight 
safety parts.  The FSCP initiative deals with the acquisition, i.e., control 
of the manufacture and post production of flight safety parts.  DOD 
4140.1R does not address FSCP per se.  Chapter 1, Acquisition Materiel 
Management, of DOD 4140.1R deals with the acquisition of spare parts 
to sustain end items.  In section C1.3, Quality Programs, the Policy 
states “Only secondary items that conform fully to contract specifications 
shall enter the DOD supply system.”  Paragraph C1.3.2.5 states “such 
quality assurance techniques and testing should stress conformance of 
critical application items to contract technical requirements.”  Chapter 1 
is generic and applies to all DOD parts not just aircraft, or safety related 
parts.  At present, there is no DOD policy specifically for FSCP.  Each 
Service independently establishes a policy and method for the 
procurement of FSCP.  The acquisition criteria, quality requirements, 
and vendor qualification for FSCP are determined by each Service ESA. 
 
The FSCAP initiative focuses on documentation and disposal of 
parts, and is addressed in DOD 4140.1R, chapter 6, Other Logistics 
Programs, Paragraph C6.5, DOD Flight Safety Critical Parts (FSCAP) 
Program.  FSCAP has a common definition, due to the efforts of the joint 
FAA/DOD FSCAP PAT, September 1994 – May 1995, and has 
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documentation in the FLIS with disposal instructions for each FSCAP.  
The FAA/DOD PAT defined FSCAP as: 
“Any aircraft part assembly, or installation containing a 
Critical Characteristic whose failure, malfunction, or 
absence may cause a catastrophic failure resulting in loss or 
serious damage to the aircraft or an uncommanded engine 
shutdown resulting in an unsafe condition.” [Ref. 6:C 6.5] 
 
The policy for FSCAP set forth in DOD 4140.1R states: 
“The Department of Defense shall identify and control FSCAP 
throughout their life cycle to ensure only safe parts are 
installed on military aircraft, or are released to the civil 
aircraft market though disposal sales, exchanges or other 
authorized transfers of DOD parts.  DOD 4140.1R requires 
DOD to develop a criticality code structure to identify FSCAP 
items and ensure FSCAP without historical maintenance 
records are mutilated before disposal.” [Ref. 6:C 6.5] 
 
1. What is the Army’s definition of FSCP? 
The Army maintains a Flight Safety Parts (FSP) program in lieu of 
FSCP program for manufacturing and postproduction support, however, 
for disposal the Army uses the term FSCAP as defined in DOD 4140.1R. 
 
The Army has two FSP definitions, one for the airframe and one for 
aircraft engines.“Flight Safety Parts (FSP) (Aircraft and Components) – 
Any Part, assembly, or installation containing a critical 
characteristic30 whose failure, malfunction or absence could 
cause loss of or serious damage to the aircraft and/or 
serious injury or death to the occupants.” [Ref. 22:p 2] 
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30 Critical Characteristics are any feature of a FSP, such as dimension, finish, material or assembly, 
manufacturing or inspection process, installation, operation, field maintenance, or depot overhaul 
requirement which, if nonconforming, missing, or degraded could cause the failure or malfunction of the 
FSP. [Ref. 22:p 2] 
“Flight Safety Parts (Engine) – Any Part, assembly, or 
installation containing a critical characteristic whose failure, 
malfunction or absence could cause an uncommanded 
engine shutdown, and/or an uncontained engine failure 
resulting in loss of or serious damage to an aircraft and/or 
serious injury or death to the occupants.” [Ref. 22:p 2] 
 
2. What is the Air Force’s definition of FSCP? 
The Air Force does not distinguish between parts during the 
acquisition phase.  The Air Force FSCP policy starts after acquisition and 
uses the definition in DOD 4140.1R for FSCAP. 
 
3. What is the Navy’s definition of FSCP? 
The Navy uses the term Critical Safety item (CSI) in lieu of FSCP 
and FSCAP.  The terms “Critical Safety Item,” “Flight Safety Critical 
Part,” “Flight Safety Critical Aircraft Part,” from a Navy point of view are 
synonymous.  The Navy defines CSI as: 
“A part, assembly, installation, or production system with 
one or more critical characteristics that, if not conforming to 
the design data or quality requirements, would result in a 
unsafe condition that could cause loss or serious damage to 
the end item or major components, loss of control, or serious 
injury to personnel. Unsafe conditions relate to hazard 
severity categories I and II of Mil-STD-882C, Systems Safety 
Requirements.  CSI are subsets of Critical Application Items 
(CAI), and include items determined to be “life limited”, 
“fracture critical”.  “fatigue sensitive”, etc.  The determining 
factor in CSIs is the consequence of failure, not the 
probability that the failure or consequence would occur.” 
[Ref. 29) 
 
The Navy uses CSI in-lieu of FSCP in-order to include other critical 
equipment used to support naval Aviation.  The Navy is concerned about 
more than "flight safety" and "aircraft parts."  Naval Aviation is deeply 
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concerned about parts used to launch and arrest aircraft aboard ship, 
parts used on missiles and other weapon systems, and parts used in life-
support and life saving situations.  The management rules for these 
types of items need to be as carefully constructed and managed as 
aircraft parts.  The term "Critical Safety Item" is generic enough to 
address not only all "aviation-related" critical components, but also 
critical components used on non-aviation platforms. [Ref. 27] 
 
B. HOW DO THE DOD MILITARY SERVICES IMPLEMENT A FSCP 
POLICY? 
Each Service independently establishes a FSCP policy based upon 
mission, Service culture, the interpretation of CICA, and the 
disappearance of Military Standards.  This section covers the life cycle 
policy of FSCP, i.e., from the purchasing of FSCP to the disposal of 
FSCAP.  The procedures for the identification, control, and disposal of 
FSCAP will be addressed in subsequent sections. 
 
1. What is Army’s FSP policy, and how is it implemented? 
The Army’s policy is to procure FSP only from sources whose parts 
have met engineering testing requirements. 
 
In January 1996 Major General John E. Cusick, Commanding 
General of the U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command, signed a Policy 
Memorandum subject: Flight Safety Parts Acquisition Policy.  The 
purpose of this memorandum was to establish a U.S. Army policy 
regarding the acquisition of flight safety parts.  The Policy states: 
“The Army’s policy is to acquire high quality, proven, 
reliable, and safe Flight Safety Parts.  Flight Safety Parts 
which require engineering testing (fatigue and/or endurance, 
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interchangeability) shall be procured only from sources 
whose part has met the engineering test requirements.” [Ref. 
21] 
 
The Army’s FSP program is implemented through the U.S. Army 
Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) Regulation 702-7, Flight Safety 
Parts / New Source Testing Program Management.  AMCOM is the 
proponent for AMCOM Regulation 702-7.  AMCOM Regulation 702-7 
applies to all elements of AMCOM, its subordinate organizations, and by 
concurrence, Program Executive Office, Aviation, and its organizations.  
The Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering 
Center (AMRDEC) within AMCOM is the Army’s ESA. 
 
The requirements of AMCOM Regulation 702-7 apply to all FSPs 
and assemblies containing FSPs, i.e., FSP delivered as part of the end 
item, and parts purchased from the OEM, OEM licensed vendors, and 
breakout vendors. 
 
The Army policy in AMCOM Regulation 702-7 covers the entire 
lifecycle of a FSP.  To cover the entire gamut from cradle to grave the 
policy for FSP in AMCOM Regulation 702-7 is broken down into 4 
categories; Management policy, Acquisition policy, Issue policy, and 
Repair/Overhaul policy.  The Army applies the FSCAP policy in 4140.1R 
for the documentation and disposal of FSCAP. 
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Management policy  
All Army FSP are controlled and managed by AMCOM. [Ref. 
22:p 3]  DLA manages consumable FSP for AMCOM31, but in keeping 
with AMCOM Regulation 702-7 FSP management policy, AMRDEC is the 
ESA for Army FSP.  DLA maintains a STDP for army FSP in order to buy 
new parts to replenish the supply system.  The Army ESA maintains the 
master STDP and updates the DLA STDP as changes occur.  If DLA has 
questions or concerns about the STDP or technical requirements, DLA 
contacts the Army ESA for answers or clarification. 
 
AMRDEC has the engineering and technical expertise to 
identify, maintain, and preserve the critical characteristics, which makes 
up a FSP.  AMRDEC is the final authority for Army FSP.  When DLA buys 
new FSP, the buying ICP reviews the SAMMS for the current Technical 
Data Package or configuration of the part.  If there is an anomaly, or a 
question about the part or qualified buyers, the ICP will send an 
Engineering Support Request, DLA Form 339, to AMRDEC to obtain the 
current technical data package and qualified suppliers list.  Figure 3 
shows the DLA FSP acquisition process. 
 
Acquisition policy 
The Army’s policy is to acquire high quality, proven, reliable, 
and safe Flight Safety Parts.  AMCOM Reg. 702-7 further defines the 
Army’s policy in that only new unused FSP will be procured from 
approved sources.  An approved source is a manufacturer or vendor who 
has satisfied, prior to contract award, all AMCOM source approval 
requirements to include, if applicable, engineering testing requirements 
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31 AMCOM manages Army unique repairable FSP and DLA manages consumable and DOD common 
repairable FSP for the Army. 
(fatigue, endurance, and/or interchangeability).  Procurement of 
recycled, recovered, remanufactured, surplus, used, or reconditioned 
FSP is not authorized, and local procurement of FSP is not authorized. 
[Ref. 22] 
 







































Figure 3.   DLA FSP Acquisition Process  [From: Ref. 39] 
 
Through the Supplier Interface And Oversight Program 
(SIOP), the Army continuously performs surveillance visits, quality 
inspections of contractors’ facilities, routinely monitors contractor 
performance, and performs conformance inspections and audits.  SIOP 
reviews contractor frozen process planning, assures compliance with FSP 
program requirements, documents findings and issues, and establishes 
dialog with manufactures regarding FSP program and program 
requirements. 
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 If a contractor has difficulty in maintaining process control 
as evidenced through such things as adverse internal management 
audits, customer audits, the receipt of Quality Deficiency reports or 
adverse SIOP results, the contractor shall be subject to removal from the 
approved supplier list. [Ref. 22:p 3] 
 
All contractors for Army FSP containing manufacturing 
critical characteristics are required to maintain a documented quality 
program to the standards of Quality Engineering Standard 1 (QE Std-1) 
or better.  QE Std-1 is a quality standard that establishes the minimum 
quality program that is required to manufacture FSP containing 
manufacturing critical characteristics. 
 
Issue policy 
Only fully qualified FSP (procured form approved sources) 
will be released for use on Army aircraft.  The AMCOM Commanding 
General may waive this requirement in order to meet critical mission 
requirements. If the qualification requirement is waived, the part 
released is considered suspect, and a Systems Safety Risk Assessment 
(SSRA) is performed to determine the risk involved. 
 
FSP in the army inventory purchased from breakout vendors 
prior to the issuance of the Army FSP Policy memorandum were not 
tested.  Suspect parts purchased from breakout vendors were in the 
army inventory and on army aircraft.  Due to operational readiness and 
mission requirements all untested FSP purchased from breakout vendors 
could not be removed from operational aircraft and the supply system.  
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The army assessed the risk of continuing to use untested parts until the 
parts could be tested or purged from the inventory and replaced by 
tested parts.  The army is still performing SSRAs on untested parts 
today.  Figure 432 shows the progress the Army is making toward 
removing untested parts from the inventory.  The bottom line is after the 
untested parts have been purged from the inventory, the Army will use 
only FSP from tested sources. 
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AH-64 28 28 27 1 1 16
UH-60 72 72 69 3 0 0 32
CH-47 143 143 124 19 0 102
T-55 4 4 4 0 0
AH-1 44 44 39 5 0 20
OH-58A/C 9 9 9 0 3
UH-1 55 55 52 3 20
T-53 33 33 32 1 4
*Total 388 388 356 32 0 1 197 0
* (O f 8 8 2  P a rts  In v e s tig a te d )
 
Figure 4.   SSRA Overview [From: Ref. 38] 
 
Repair/Overhaul policy 
Depot level overhaul/repair will be accomplished only by 
qualified sources.  Prior to authorizing field, organic, or commercial depot 
repair of an FSP, AMCOM will perform a Product Verification Audit (PVA).  
A PVA ensures the potential repair activity has frozen process planning, 
                                                           
32 Status of Army SSRA as of 16 Jan 01. 
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is capable of performing the repair, and maintains the safety integrity of 
the FSP. 
 
All contractors performing M&O for Army FSP are required to 
maintain a documented quality program to the standards of QE Std-2 or 
better.  QE Std-2 is a quality standard that establishes the minimum 
quality program required for the M&O of assemblies that contain or 
affect a critical characteristic. 
 
The Army’s policy includes the documentation and disposal of FSP.  
AMCOM Regulation 702-7 compliments and enforces the DOD FSCAP 
policy in DOD regulation 4140.1R, and covers the entire lifecycle of a 
flight safety part 
 
2. What is the Air Force’s FSCAP policy, and how is it 
implemented? 
41 
The Air Force has two categories of FSCP one for the acquisition of 
engine parts, Engine Flight Safety Critical Parts (EFSCP), and one for the 
acquisition of airframe parts FSCP.  The Air Force EFSCP policy is to 
restrict the acquisition of propulsion FSCPs to the OEM or an OEM 
licensed vendor.  This policy is currently restricted to propulsion 
components, and was developed through a Joint Propulsion Coordinating 
Committee (JPCC) initiative (Mar 99) based on an in-depth study 
specifically focused on propulsion components.  The Air Force no longer 
qualifies alternate sources for EFSCPs, and in the limited cases where 
breakout has occurred the approval is being revoked.  The policy has a 
caveat; the Air Force ESA, using specific criteria specified in a 
Memorandum Of Agreement (MOA) signed by the JPCC, must approve 
OEM-licensed vendors.  In essence the approval involves review of the 
license agreement with the OEM to insure that the agreement provides 
the essential value added by the OEM that was specifically identified in 
the EFSCP study.  The JPCC policy was later endorsed by the Joint 
Aeronautical Commanders Group (JACG) (Mar 99) but the endorsement 
was specific to propulsion components.  In order to restrict competition 
effectively and defend against challenges it is necessary to document 
value added by the OEM that cannot be replaced by the Government or 
alternate sources. [Ref. 36] 
 
The Air Force does not have a policy for the acquisition of airframe 
FSCP.  The Air Force procures FSCP from the OEM, or OEM licensed 
vendors.  Air Force Materiel Command engineers review each item as to 
the criticality, complexity and the consequence of failure, and determine 
if, and why qualification requirement must be demonstrated before 
contract award.  If this analysis is affirmative, a Qualification 
Requirement (QR) Wavier is developed for the item in accordance with 
(IAW) the requirements of Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 9.202(a) 
or 9.202(b).  Where reprocurement data is available, the basis for a 
source restriction is FAR 9.2.  On the extremely critical/complex & 
disastrous consequence of failure type items, many engineers process 
FAR 9.202 QR Waivers even when there is no data or data is proprietary. 
The individual engineer is responsible for these decisions. 
 
Normally an item that is acquired via Local Purchase will not be 
identified as FSCAP; however, in the unusual circumstance that a FSCAP 
item is authorized for Local Purchase, the purchase must be made from 
an FAA approved contractor or production facility and the purchase 
request must include the requirement for an FAA Form 8130-3, 
Airworthiness Tag.  Items bought using the International Merchant 
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Purchase Authorization Card (IMPAC) must comply with United States 
Air Force procedures for using the IMPAC.  The retail level of supply 
must never designate an item as FSCAP or assign a criticality code; these 
actions are only authorized to be accomplished at the wholesale level. 
 
For documentation and control of FSCP, the Air Force FSCP policy 
is identified as Flight Safety Critical Aircraft Parts (FSCAP) and it is 
implemented in AFMAN 23-110, Vol. 6, Chapter 10. 
 
3. What is the Navy’s CSI policy, and how is it 
implemented? 
The Navy’s CSI program is implemented through NAVAIRINST 
4200.25C, “Engineering Reviews Of New Sources For Procurement Repair 
Or Overhaul Of Replenishment Critical Safety Items”, 3 September 1999.  
NAVAIRINST 4200.25C establishes policy, procedures, and assigns 
responsibilities for engineering reviews of Source Approval Requests 
(SARs) for the procurement, repair, or overhaul of Naval aviation 
replenishment spare parts that meet the definition of CSI. [Ref. 31:p 1]  
The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) is the proponent for 
NAVAIRINST 4200.25C, and it applies to the Naval Aviation Systems 
Team, Systems engineering Department (AIR-4.1), Air vehicle Systems 
and Subsystems Department (AIR-4.3), Propulsion and Power 
Engineering Department (AIR-4.4), and the Navy Inventory Control Point, 
Philadelphia, PA (NAVICP-P), and cognizant Naval Aviation Depots 
(NAVAVNDEPOT). [Ref. 31:p 1] 
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The acquisition policy for the Navy is to procure only new and 
unused CSI from approved sources, and the Navy will accept only CSIs 
that conform to all critical characteristics.  The NAVAIR Research and 
Engineering group (AIR 4.0) is responsible for providing the engineering 
policies, processes, and support necessary to ensure design integrity and 
airworthiness throughout the lifecycle of naval aviation systems and 
equipment. [Ref. 29:p 2]  NAVAIR is the Engineering Support Activity 
(ESA) and the airworthiness authority for the Navy.  Only NAVAIR is 
authorized to approve sources for the procurement of CSI. 
 
To ensure alternate sources remain capable of delivering 
satisfactory items, NAVAIR 4.0 reevaluates alternate sources if they have 
not delivered or repaired/overhauled the specific CSI for DOD within 3 
years of an anticipated contract award.  Alternate sources shall be 
reevaluated if there are concerns regarding product quality, 
manufacturing process changes, the source moves their manufacturing 
location, or the source has transferred their manufacturing facilities over 
the prior 3 years. [Ref. 29:p. 5] 
 
The repair/overhaul of Naval aviation systems and equipment 
containing CSIs will be from approved sources only.  Navy Aviation 
depots (NAVAVNDEPOTs) and other government organic facilities are 
authorized to make CSIs on a limited basis provided they meet the 
alternate source qualifications criteria.  NAVAVNDEPOTs and other 
government facilities are considered alternate sources for CSIs and must 
meet the qualification criteria of alternate sources.  When a CSI cannot 
be procured from the Prime vendor or from alternate sources and the 
technical data is not available reverse engineering may be considered. 
 
The Competition In Contracting Act of 1984 mandated the 
breakout of repair parts and consumable items to stimulate competition 
and to provide small and disadvantaged businesses access to lucrative 
44 
defense contracts.  Initially the Navy did not take breakout of CSI 
seriously.  The Navy developed a Justification and Approval (J&A) for sole 
source procurement of FSP from the prime vendor.  The Navy did not 
want to set precedence for the breakout of CSI, they wanted to make the 
prime vendor responsible for the parts the prime vendor produced.  
However, the Navy did start qualifying alternate sources for procurement 
of CSIs in the late 1997 time-frame. 
 
Initial experiences in implementing breakout of CSI demonstrated 
that controls were needed before acquiring CSIs from new sources of 
supply. [Ref. 25]  Navy ICPs have complete independence and authority 
to make breakout decisions on Non-CSIs, [Ref. 26:p 1-1] however, 
NAVAIR is the Aircraft Airworthiness Authority for the Navy and makes 
all breakout decisions for CSIs. 
 
DLA provides item management functions for DOD.  Consumable 
Item transfer (CIT) from the Services to DLA began in 1991.  CIT was 
performed in two phases.  CIT I was performed from August 1991 to 
November 1995, the Navy transferred 760,000 items to DLA for 
management; a significant number of CAIs were transferred.  CIT II was 
performed from January 1996 to October 1997, and 152,000 Navy Items 
were transferred.  CIT II included Navy unique CAIs and a majority of the 
Navy’s CSIs were transferred. 
 
DLA manages 3,795 CSI NSNs for the Navy, and in Sept 2000 the 
navy identified 942 CSIs which were procured from suspect sources33.  
Figure 5 [Ref. 24:s 7] shows the distribution of Navy NSNs by category. 
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33 A source that has not been approved as an alternate source.  A source whose part has not undergone 



















Figure 5.   Target Population  [From: Ref. 24] 
 
C. HOW DO THE MILITARY SERVICES IDENTIFY, DOCUMENT, 
AND CONTROL FSCP? 
This section studies the procedures for the identification, 
documentation and control of FSCP used by each Service. 
 
A FSCAP Process Action Team (PAT), consisting of members from 
the FAA, Coast Guard, DOD, Army, Navy, Air Force, and DLA, chaired by 
Mr. James R Klug, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense and Mr. Anthony 
J. Broderick, Associate Administrator, FAA, produced a final report dated 
8 May 95.  An implementation FSCAP team was formed to carry out the 
tasking set forth in the PAT Final report.  The Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) chaired this team with representatives for the FAA, Coast 
Guard, Army, Navy, Air Force, and DLA.  DOD 4140.1R, DOD materiel 
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Management Regulation, section C6.5, DOD Flight Safety Critical Aircraft 
Parts (FSCAP) Program was a product of this team.  Section C6.5 of DOD 
4140.1R was published in May 1998. [Ref. 34] 
 
The DOD policy for FSCAP as published in DOD 4140.1R, C6.5 is: 
“The Department of Defense shall identify and control 
FSCAPs throughout their life cycle to ensure only parts are 
installed on military aircraft or are released to the civil 
aircraft market through disposal, exchanges or other 
authorized transfers of DOD parts.  The Department of 
Defense shall develop a criticality code structure to identify 
FSCAP items and ensure that used FSCAP items are 
mutilated if they are being disposed of without historical 
maintenance records, Loans, gifts and exchanges made 
under 10 U.S.C. 2572 that involve FSCAPs shall be done in 
accordance with DOD 4160.21-M and DOD 4160.21-M-1.” 
[Ref. 6:C6.5] 
 
DOD 4140.1R requires all FSCAPs to be identified in the FLIS by 
an applicable criticality code, and DOD 4140.1R requires repairable 
FSCAP to be managed and tracked by Serial number where practical. 
[Ref. 6:c 6.5]  DOD 4140.1R also requires historical records  for FSCAP to 
be maintained and shipped with the part. 
 
1. How does the Army identify and document FSCP? 
Initially the OEM identifies parts that are to be considered FSP, the 
Army ESA reviews and approves the list, and adjusts the list based on 
reports from the field, i.e., Equipment Improvement Recommendations, 
Quality Deficiency Reports, Report of Discrepancy, accident report etc.  
The Classification of an item as an FSP is based solely on its influence on 
flight safety and not upon considerations such as item cost, complexity, 
fatigue life, and/or procurement lead times [Ref. 22] 
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 The Army FSP program requires life cycle identification and control 
of all Army FSP and their associated critical characteristics.  The Army 
requires engineering part or assembly drawings for FSP to be marked as 
FSP, and all critical characteristics are required to be documented on 
The FSP drawing.  Critical characteristic identification and control 
procedures are required to be included in all related maintenance and 
overhaul documents.  All Army FSP are required to have a serial number, 
and all technical and quality requirements relating to FSP shall be 
traceable to the time and location that they were produced.  Those FSP 
which have only “installation critical characteristic” and no life tracking 
requirements are not required to be serialized, but still require 
tractability to the manufactured lot. [Ref. 22:p B3]  For Dual use parts, 
the following clause is required to be inserted into all contractual 
requirements for FSP: 
“The offeror shall identify in its proposal any item being 
offered which is also currently sold to commercial customers 
and for which FAA Form 8130-3 is supplied by the offeror.  
For such items the offeror shall provide the same form to the 
government at the time of item delivery.” [Ref 22:p 4] 
 
The Army identifies FSP in the Commodity Command Standard 
System (CCSS) and assigns a criticality Code of “E” or “F”34 designating 
the part as FSP.  Sector 2800 of the National Stock Number Master Data 
Record (NSNMDR) shall be updated to uniquely identify FSP that have 
manufacturing critical characteristics, and engineering testing 
requirements. 
 
2. How does the Air Force identify and document FSCAP? 
                                                           
48 
34 Criticality code of “F” designates an item to be FSCAP.  Criticality code of “E” designates an item to be 
nuclear hardened FSCAP. 
The Air Force policy for the identification and documentation of 
FSCAP is contained in Air Force manual 23-110, Volume 6, chapter 10 
Flight Safety Critical Aircraft Parts (FSCAP) Program.  The Air Force 
FSCAP program is modeled after the DOD FSCAP policy found in DOD 
4140.1R, C6.5. 
 
As new weapon systems are developed the criticality code is 
determined during the normal provisioning process, and FSCAP are 
assigned a criticality code of “E” or “F”.  The wholesale Inventory 
Manager (IM) is responsible for designating and assigning the critically 
code to FSCAP items they manage.  The IM adjust the initial provisioning 
list of FSCAP based on reports from the field, i.e., has the part been 
involved in an accident.  Any item that meets the criteria for FSCAP when 
reviewing drawings, Logistics Support Analysis Record (LSAR) (if the 
aircraft was developed under MIL-STD-1388-2B), Essentiality Codes 
(EC), and Failure Modes Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA), and/or 
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) analysis are considered FSCAP 
and are assigned a Criticality Code of E or F.  In reviewing the EC if it is 
determined that the aircraft cannot fly when the item fails, or if the 
aircraft can still fly after failure of the item, but there is risk to personnel 
safety then the item is considered to be FSCAP.  If the aircraft was 
developed with MIL-STD-1388-2B on contract, the essentiality code can 
be found in the LSAR HG Table.  If the aircraft was developed with MIL-
STD-1629A on contract, then the category I and category II Failure Mode 
List should be used to identify the FSACP. [Ref. 32] 
 
The Air Force Controls and tracks FSCAP by serial number 
throughout the life cycle of the item.  Serial numbered items are required 
to be accompanied by historical maintenance records.  Items that are not 
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assigned a serial number may be designated as FSCAP; however, non-
serialized items will not have historical maintenance records available for 
specific individualized items.  Used FSCAP items without the appropriate 
historical maintenance documentation and new FSCAP item without the 
original manufacturer’s pack and contract data must be mutilated prior 
to turn-in to the DRMO. [Ref. 32:para. 10.3.1.1.1]  Activities are required 
to forward all available historical data/documents with individual FSCAP 
items when the materiel is shipped to another user or transferred to the 
DMRO.  Historical Documentation shall consist of the Air Force 
Technical Order (AFTO) Form 95 or computer generated facsimile and/or 
FAA Form 8130 (Airworthiness approval Tag). [Ref. 32:para. 10.3.1.1.2] 
 
Each item that is processed by the Repair Cycle Support Unit and 
returned to a Supply facility for storage must be accompanied by a 
computer generated maintenance historical record (facsimile AFTO Form 
95).  All repairable serially controlled FSCAP items that have been 
processed by maintenance are required to have the maintenance 
historical record attached.  When a FSCAP item is turned-in by 
maintenance without the historical record/documentation the condition 
tag or label shall be annotated “Historical maintenance records are not 
available.”  All used FSCAP items that do not have historical 
maintenance records available, must be mutilated prior to turn-in to 
DRMO.  The maintenance activity shall not mutilate any FSCAP items 
until the items are actually declared excess and directed for transfer to 
DRMO. [Ref. 32:para. 10.3.4] 
 
3. How does the Navy identify and document FSCP? 
The NAVAIR Basic Design Engineer (BDE) determines if a new 
replenishment item is to be classified a CSI, and during initial 
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provisioning of an item, the Navy ESA verifies the item is a CSI.  Items 
are initially treated as CSIs when identified as life limiting, fatigue 
sensitive, Fracture Critical, or Engineering Critical and having at least 
one critical characteristic in the technical data, or identified in a 
contractor’s critical parts list. [Ref 29:p 3] 
 
Drawings and associated technical data shall clearly identify that 
the item is CSI.  Drawings and technical data shall identify the critical 
and major characteristics, critical processes, and quality assurance 
requirements.  Drawings for CSIs shall be IAW the latest version of ANSI 
Y14.100, Engineering Drawing Practices, and MIL-STD-100G, DOD 
Standard Practice for Engineering Drawings.  Critical and major 
characteristics for CSIs shall be established in accordance with DOD-
STD-2101,  
 
Repairable CSI are managed, documented and tracked by serial 
number throughout their lifecycle.  When required by technical 
documentation, consumable CSIs shall also be managed, documented, 
and tracked by serial number throughout their lifecycle.  When not 
required by technical documentation, consumable CSI shall have serial 
number, contractor cage codes, or distinguishable marking schemes 
where applicable.  Changing the manufactures marking on a CSI is 
prohibited. 
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D. HOW ARE FSCP MANUFACTURERS QUALIFIED AND PARTS 
TESTED BY EACH SERVICE? 
Due to the requirement of CICA, spare parts are required to be 
broke-out; DOD 4140.1R35 reinforces this requirement.  The DOD 
procurement policy in DOD 4140.1R is that only secondary items that 
conform fully to contract specifications are to enter the DOD supply 
system. [Ref 6:para. C1.31]  Since most contract specifications for FSCP 
critical characteristics cannot be confirmed without engineering testing, 
i.e., materiel, tolerances, hardness, strength, etc, it is essential to qualify 
the processes and procedures of contractors who are awarded FSCP 
contracts.  Once the contract for an FSCP is awarded, stringent quality 
assurance methods are required to be demonstrated and tested to ensure 
that manufactured items conform to contract technical requirements. 
 
1. How does the Army qualify FSP manufacturers, and what 
testing is required? 
The Prime Contactor is responsible for the design of the aircraft 
and establishes the technical requirements and critical characteristics 
for all components and piece parts.  Prime contractors of Army aircraft 
are required to identify FSP that have manufacturing and installation 
critical characteristics36, and establish and maintain a FSP program.  As 
part of the FSP program, contractors are required to have a Contractor 
Configuration Control Board (CCB) that monitor and control the FSP 
program.  The prime contactor is contractually required to perform 
periodic audits of their subcontractor’s/vendor’s FSP program to assure 
                                                           
35 DOD shall reduce the costs of spare parts through the use of competitive procurement methods, or the 
purchase of parts directly for the actual manufacturer rather than the prime contractor while maintaining the 
integrity of the systems and equipment in which the parts are to be use.  The DOD Spare parts breakout 
program shall carry out that policy. [Ref 6:para C1.5.1] 
36 Manufacturing Critical Characteristics: Critical characteristics produced during the manufacturing 
process. 
Installation Critical Characteristics:  Critical Characteristics that are not introduced during the manufacture 
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that adequate program controls are in place and complied with.  At a 
minimum, audits will be performed at the start of each production 
contract, annually, and when process changes occur. [Ref. 22:p C4] 
 
In keeping with CICA, and DOD 4140.1R, spare parts are required 
to be broke-out. The Army’s FSP policy meets that intent, i.e., FSP will 
only be procured from approved sources.  The AMCOM new source-
testing program requires breakout contractors to establish a FSP 
program, and pass engineering qualification testing.  Manufacturing 
engineering qualification requirements include First Article Test (FAT).  
First Article testing, test all the critical characteristics of the part, i.e., 
metallurgic, fatigue, stress, hardness, tolerance, etc.  M&O Engineering 
qualification requirements consist of a Product Verification Audit (PVA).  
AMCOM standards for a FSP program are the same for breakout 
contractors and prime contactors alike.  Contractors are required to 
establish and maintain a quality program, QE Std 1 is the minimum 
standards for a manufacturers quality program, and QE Std 2 is the 
minimum requirements for M&O contractors.  Each manufacturing, 
assembly, and M&O process producing a critical characteristic is 
required to be controlled by detailed procedures outlining each step of 
the process including tooling, equipment, and operator certification 
requirements.  These procedures are reviewed and approved by the CCB 
and AMCOM.  Once approved, these procedures, including sequence of 
operations, are required to be frozen, if any portion of the procedure 
changes the process must be requalified. 
 
Maintenance and Overhaul (M&O) contractors which 
overhaul/repair FSP with critical characteristics or installation critical 
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of a part, but are critical in terms of assembly and/or installation, e.g., proper torque. [Ref. 30:slide 5] 
characteristics are required to meet the same qualification requirements 
as manufactures of new parts.  New and Overhauled/repaired FSP 
cannot be released to the supply system until the contractor passes the 
PVA. 
 
If there is a critical need for a FSP part the Commanding General 
of AMCOM may waive the testing requirements.  For parts released 
without a engineering test a System Safety Risk Assessment must be 
performed and approved before distribution.  All critical characteristics 
that can be nondestructively inspected/tested require 100% inspection 
by the contractor, or subcontractor.  Critical characteristics that require 
destructive testing are to be tested on a lot or batch basis, with no skip 
lots allowed.  Once the program demonstrates that the critical processes 
are statistically in control, stable and capable, the contractor may 
request inspection by a statistical process control program in lieu of 
100% inspection. [Ref. 22:p C4] 
 
2. How does the Air Force qualify FSCP manufacturers, and 
what testing is required? 
The Air Force does not breakout FSCP.  The Air Force engineer 
responsible for the FSCP determines and documents the critical 
characteristics for the FSCP and produces a QR Waiver to procure the 
part from the OEM, OEM licensed vendor or prime Contractor.  The Air 
Force exerts extensive process control over prime contractor to ensure 
procedures are in place to control the critical characteristics and ensure 
high quality. 
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3. How does the Navy qualify CSI manufacturers, and what 
testing is required? 
The acquisition policy for the Navy is to procure only new and 
unused CSI from approved sources.  Approved sources include the prime 
contractor, the actual manufacturer who made the part for the prime 
contractor, fully licensed vendors of the prime contractor, and alternate 
sources approved by the Navy ESA.  Prime contractors, and actual 
manufactures for the prime contractor that have quality plans approved 
by the government do not need to be requalified.  CSI sources approved 
by other Services that have common parts with the Navy do not need to 
be requalified. 
 
Navy ESAs reevaluate alternate sources for CSI if there are 
concerns relating to product quality, manufacturing process changes, or 
they have not produced a part within three years of a proposed contract.  
Surplus offers of CSIs are considered only if the supplier provides 
substantiation that the proposed item was originally manufactured by an 
approved source, the item is new and unused, the surplus item conforms 
to the item technical data requirements, and the shelf-life or other time 
critical aspects of the item are well within established limits. 
 
E. WHAT PROCEDURES ARE USED TO RETIRE AND DISPOSE OF 
FSCAP BY EACH SERVICE? 
DOD is required by the Surplus Property Act of 1944 to dispose of 
its surplus property; however, it is prevented from destroying property 
with any economic value.  This section studies the disposal methods of 
FSCAP for each Service 
 
55 
1. What is the Army’s FSP retirement and disposal 
procedure? 
The Army’s policy for disposal is embedded in DOD 4140.1R.   The 
Army’s policy is to release surplus FSP to the Defense Reutilization and 
Marketing Offices (DRMO) for disposal.  FSP that are serviceable, and 
have historical records attached will be released to other government 
agencies, or sold to civil aviation.  FSP that have exceeded their useful 
life, or do not have historical records will be mutilated. 
 
2. What is the Air Force’s FSCAP retirement and disposal 
procedure? 
The Air Force Policy is; only serviceable FSCAP with historical 
maintenance documentation attached will be released to the DRMO for 
disposal or release to the civil aviation market, all FSCAP without proper 
historical maintenance records will be mutilation.  Used serviceable 
FSCAP items that do not have historical maintenance documentation 
may be issued or shipped to other DOD activities (other than DRMO), 
provided that the activity agrees that they can use the item without the 
documentation.  FSCAP without historical maintenance records may be 
issued or turned-in to DRMO without applying the mutilation 
requirement if the materiel is new/unused and still packaged in the 
original manufacturer’s container that reflects all of the identification 
and contracting data. 
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Supply activities will not accept any FSCAP item for storage unless 
the historical maintenance records are attached, or the materiel 
condition tag is annotated “Historical Maintenance Records are Not 
Available”.  When an item is designated as FSCAP and the historical 
documentation is not available, the item shall be processed to the 
appropriate maintenance activity for mutilation prior to being turned-in 
to DRMO. [Ref. 32:para. 10.3.4.3] 
 
3. What is the Navy’s CSI retirement and disposal 
procedure? 
All CSIs shall be considered to be FSCAP in accordance with DOD 
Regulation 4140.1R, C6.5, DOD Flight Safety Critical Parts (FSCAP) 
Program.  When CSIs are no longer required by naval aviation, the CSIs 
and associated documentation shall be provided to the DRMO for 
disposal.  CSIs that are defective, nonconforming, have exceeded or are 
approaching their life for time/use critical limits, or for which there is no 
reliable documentation regarding the manufacture, acquisition, use, 
modification, repair, or overhaul shall be mutilated prior to disposal. 
[Ref. 29:p 9] 
 
F. HOW DOES THE FAA INTERFACE WITH THE DOD FSCP 
PROGRAM? 
The FAA is part of the Department of Transportation.  The FAA 
coordinates and communicates with DOD at the executive level.  The FAA 
and DOD coordinate policies that affect both Military and Civil Aviation. 
 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is the element of the 
U.S. government with primary responsibility for the safety of civil 
aviation.  The FAA issues and enforces regulations and minimum 
standards relating to the manufacture, operation, and maintenance of 
aircraft.  As part of its activities, the FAA periodically reviews and 
updates the regulations, and issues policy guidance to its inspectors and 
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advisory information to the industry to achieve compliance with the 
regulations. 
 
DOD is required by the Surplus Property Act of 1944 to dispose of 
its surplus property.  Consequently, certain aviation parts that are 
considered surplus by the military are sold.  Some of these may be unfit 
for any aviation application, some may not be appropriate for use on a 
civil aircraft, and others may be acceptable for use on civil aircraft.  One 
of the important questions is whether or not there is sufficient 
documentation or other identifying information associated with a given 
part to determine which of these three possibilities is the case. 
 
Within the past 5 years, the FAA has intensified its efforts to 
educate inspectors and the public regarding the potential safety threat 
posed by aeronautical parts that do not meet applicable design, 
manufacture, and maintenance requirements.  The FAA encourages the 
reporting of parts that may not meet applicable standards.  In 1993, the 
FAA established the Suspected Unapproved Part (SUP) Program to 
coordinate FAA efforts to minimize safety risks posed by the entry of 
“unapproved” aircraft parts into the U.S. aviation inventory and their 
installation on aircraft.  Aviation parts that had been produced for 
military applications, or produced for FAA-certificated products but 
subsequently operated in a military environment, may not have been 
produced, operated, or maintained in accordance with the Federal 
Aviation Regulations.  Their use may pose a safety. 
 
As a result of these concerns, in 1993 the FAA Regulation and 
Certification Organization established a SUPs Task Force to thoroughly 
review the issue of SUPs, evaluate the FAA’s related on-going efforts, and 
58 
to devise a comprehensive Program Plan to eliminate any potential risk to 
aviation safety.  The Task Force reviewed the planned steps for 
implementation of the DOD/FAA program with respect to surplus 
military parts and concluded that this program adequately addresses 
their concerns relating to SUPs. [Ref. 34] 
 
In 1993 and 1994, various concerns regarding military surplus 
aircraft parts, specifically those parts designated by the proponent 
military Service as FSCAP, entering into the civil marketplace led to the 
forming of a joint DOD/FAA FSCAP PAT.  This team, representing DLA, 
Army, Air Force, Navy, and the FAA, produced recommendations related 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
This Chapter analyzes the data presented in Chapter III. 
 
A. IS THE DOD DEFINITION AND POLICY FOR FSCP ADEQUATE 
TO ENSURE SAFE AIRCRAFT PARTS? 
DOD does not have a common definition, or policy for the 
acquisition of FSCP, each military Service independently establishes 
policies and procedures for the manufacture and post production 
support of FSCP.  However, there is a common definition, and policy for 
documentation, and disposal of FSCAP37. 
 
The DOD policy for FSCAP is documented in DOD 4140.1R, 
Chapter C6.5, DOD Flight Safety Critical Parts (FSCAP) Program.  The 
DOD FSCAP definition captures the intent of the FSCAP program and is 
readily accepted by the military Services, the FAA, and most users.  The 
definition for FSCAP is deemed appropriate.  The FSCAP policy is from a 
high level perspective and covers the documentation and disposal of 
FSCAP effectively, however it is silent as to quality requirements for the 
acquisition or repair of FSCP.  The qualification of new sources of supply 
and repair is also left open.  The intent of the Flight Safety Critical 
Aircraft Parts Program is to address the issues, needs, and requirements, 
to acquire safe, reliable quality parts, but the upfront logistics to 
accomplish this goal has been overlooked in DOD 4140.1R, C6.5. 
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37 The Navy uses the term CSI in lieu of FSCP and FSCAP, and the CSI for the purpose of definition is 
synonymous with both terms. 
B. COMPARE/CONTRAST THE DOD MILITARY SERVICE’S FSCP 
POLICY. 
Each Service has a policy and procedure for managing FSCP.  
These policies and procedures are similar in some ways and quite 
different in other ways.  In comparison all three Services make a 
distinction between the acquisition of FSCP, i.e., manufacturing and post 
production from FSCAP, i.e., the identification, documentation, and 
disposal.  In contrast the terminology used by each Service is different; 
the Army uses FSP, the Air Force uses FSCAP for life cycle support of 
FSCP; however, this does not include the upfront acquisition process, 
and the Navy uses the CSI.  The Army and the Navy both qualify 
alternate sources for the procurement of FSCP, while the Air Force uses 
a QR waiver to procure FSCP from the OEM only, or an OEM licensed 
vendor. 
 
Each Service uses service unique regulations for the acquisition of 
FSCP, but they all use a derivative of DODD 4140.1R for identification 
and disposal of FSCAP.  The army uses AMCOM Reg. 702-7, Flight Safety 
Parts/New Source Testing Program management.  The Air Force uses Air 
Force Manual 23-110, Volume 6, Chapter 10, Flight Safety Critical 
Aircraft Parts (FSCAP) program; however, this does not include the 
upfront acquisition process.  The Navy uses NAVAIR INSTRUCTION 
4200.25C, Engineering Reviews of New Sources for Procurement repair 
or overhaul of Replenishment Critical Safety Items. 
 
Each Service has a unique policy for the acquisition of FSCP.  The 
Army policy is to buy high quality proven, reliable, and safe FSP, 
procured only from approved source, i.e., sources that have passed 
engineering testing.  The Army further refines this policy and restricts 
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the acquisition of FSP to the procurement of only new unused FSP from 
qualified vendors.  The Procurement of recycled, recovered, 
remanufactured, surplus, used, or reconditioned FSP is not authorized, 
and local procurement of FSP is not authorized.  The Air Force does not 
breakout the acquisition of FSCAP, The Air Force uses a QR waiver to 
buy FSCAP from the OEM only.  Under certain conditions the air Force 
does allow local purchase of FSCAP.  When a FSCAP item is authorized 
for Local Purchase, the purchase must be made from an FAA approved 
contractor or production facility and the purchase request must include 
the requirement for an FAA Form 8130-3, Airworthiness Tag.  The Navy 
procures only new and unused CSI from approved sources, and accepts 
only CSIs that conform to all critical characteristics. 
 
DLA manages consumable and some repairable FSCP for each 
Service.  Each Service has an ESA that controls, interfaces and 
coordinates technical requirements and critical characteristics with DLA. 
 
C. COMPARE/CONTRAST HOW EACH SERVICE IDENTIFIES, 
DOCUMENTS, AND CONTROLS FSCAP. 
Each Service applies the policies and procedures governing FSCAP 
in DOD 4140.1R.  In comparing how each Service identifies, documents 
and controls FSCAP; each Service identifies FSCAP during the initial 
provisioning process, and adjusts their list of FSCAP based upon reports 
from the field.  Each Service assigns a criticality code of “E” or “F” to the 
FSCAP and enters the FSCAP with the appropriate criticality Code into 
the FLIS.  Each Service requires FSCAP to be tracked by serial number, 
and to be accompanied by historical records. 
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Each Service has adopted a policy for the identification and control 
of FSCAP/CSI modeled after DOD 4140.1R.  AMCOM Regulation 702-7, 
Aviation Engineering Flight Safety Parts/New Source Testing Program 
management, paragraph 5e, DOD Flight Safety Critical Aircraft Parts 
(FSCAP) Program states “All logistical and other requirements of DOD 
Regulation 4140.1R, chapter 6.5, not cited in this regulation shall be 
complied with.” [ref 22] 
 
Draft #9 NAVAIRINST 4200.25D, Management of Critical Safety 
Items (CSIs), and Critical Application Items (CAI), paragraph 6a(3) states 
“All CSI shall be considered to be FSCAP IAW DOD 4140.1R” [ref 29]. 
 
The documentation and tracking procedures in Air Force Manual 
23-110, volume 6, Chapter 10, Flight Safety Critical Aircraft Parts 
(FSCAP) program parallel DOD 4140.1R. 
 
D. COMPARE/CONTRAST HOW EACH DOD MILITARY SERVICE 
QUALIFIES MANUFACTURERS AND TEST PARTS. 
Delivery of safe reliable parts is a dominant concern for DOD, and 
the military Services.  Each Service has established unique processes 
and procedures to accomplish this task.  Qualification of manufacturers 
and vendors is at the heart of this issue. 
 
The Army has a formal program that relies on qualified sources for 
the procurement of FSP.  The Army allows breakout of FSP to 
manufacturers and vendors who pass the army qualification standards.  
The Army Qualifies contractors by reviewing their manufacturing 
process, quality procedures, and by testing all the critical characteristics 
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of the part, i.e., metallurgic, fatigue, stress, hardness, tolerance, etc.  The 
part produced must pass engineering qualification testing, i.e., FAT for 
new manufacture, or PVA for O&M contracts.  Contractors must meet 
quality standards of QE Std 1 or QE Std 2.  QE STD 1 establishes 
minimum quality standards for manufacturers , and QE STD 2 
establishes minimum quality standards for O&M of Army FSP.  The Army 
requires Frozen process planning for FSP manufactures, and uses the 
SIOP and the FSP Program to monitor contractor performance.  Through 
these processes the Army continuously performs surveillance visits and 
quality inspections of contractors’ facilities, routinely monitors contractor 
performance, and performs conformance inspections and audits.  This 
process reviews frozen process planning, assures compliance with FSP 
program requirements, documents findings and issues, and establishes 
dialog with manufacturers regarding FSP program and program 
requirements. 
 
The Air Force does not have a formal program for the acquisition of 
FSCAP.  The Air Force does not breakout FSCAP, the Air Force procures 
FSCAP from Prime contractors, the OEM, or OEM licensed vendors.  The 
Air Force exerts extensive process control over the prime contractors to 
ensure the quality of FSCAP, but uses only limited production lot testing. 
[Ref 37] 
 
The Navy has a formal program for CSI.  The Navy limits potential 
new sources of CSI to those who have provided the same or similar items 
to the OEM or other military Services.  The Navy has a 3-year rule, if a 
vendor has not produced a part in 3 years, they must be requalified.  
Prime contractors, and actual manufactures for the prime contractor 
that have quality plans approved by the government do not need to be 
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requalified, and CSI sources approved by other Services that have 
common parts with the Navy do not need to be requalified.  Navy ESAs 
reevaluate alternate sources for CSI if there are concerns relating to 
product quality, manufacturing process changes, or they have not 
produced a part within three years of a proposed contract.  The Navy 
uses FAT and extensive production lot testing to validate process control 
during production. 
 
E. COMPARE/CONTRAST THE PROCEDURES USED TO RETIRE 
AND DISPOSE OF FSCP BY EACH SERVICE. 
Each Service applies the FSCAP policy in DOD 4140.1R Chapter 
6.5, DOD Flight Safety Critical Aircraft Part (FSCAP) Program.  Each 
Service releases surplus FSCAP to the DRMO for Disposal, and FSCAP 
that have exceeded their useful life, or do not have historical records will 
be mutilated. 
 
F. HOW DOES THE FAA INTERFACE WITH THE FSCAP 
PROGRAM? 
The FAA is part of the Department of Transportation.  The FAA and 
DOD coordinates policies that affect both Military and Civil Aviation.  The 
FAA coordinates and communicates with DOD at the executive level38 
and at the working level39. 
 
 
                                                           
38 To resolve the issue of unsafe aviation parts being released to private industry the FAA was an equal 
member on a FSCAP Process Action Team (PAT).  The FSCAP PAT consisted of members from FAA, 
Coast Guard, DOD, Army Navy, Air Force, and DLA, chaired by Mr. James R Klug, Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense and Mr. Anthony J. Broderick, Associate Administrator, FAA. 
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39 To implement the results of the PAT an implementation FSCAP team was formed consisting of the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) chaired this team with representatives for the FAA, Coast Guard, 
Army, Navy, Air Force, and DLA 
G. WHAT EFFECT WILL STANDARD DOD FSCP PRACTICES AND 
PROCEDURES HAVE ON THE FAA? 
The Surplus Property Act of 1944 applies to all Services equally.  
The Surplus Act of 1944 requires DOD to dispose of excess military 
equipment.  A standard DOD FSCP policy goes beyond just the tracking 
documenting, control, and disposal of FSCAP.  A standard FSCP policy 
will impact the way DOD buys FSCP.  At present each Service has 
unique engineering practices and procedures for the acquisition of FSCP.  
Aircraft parts are made to the exact specifications established by the 
Service’s ESA and military parts that can fit on commercial equivalent 
aircraft might have qualification requirements that are not compatible 
with civil aviation requirements. 
 
A single standard for the production of FSCP within the military 
will allow the FAA to determine the utility of a military part without 
having to research which Service procured the part, and which 
commercial/civil restriction should apply.  A common standard will aid 
in the screening of parts compatible with civil aviation, and reduce the 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter will document the conclusions reached, and provide 
recommendations to improve the DOD FSCP program. 
 
A. OBJECTIVE 
After studying DOD, Army, Air Force, and Navy FSCP policies and 
procedures, I was able to address the objective question of this thesis: 
What are the commonalities and differences in the procedures used by 
each Services to acquire, identify, qualify, and control FSCP, and how 
can the procedures be standardized to ensure ample control of FSCP 
collectively across all the Services within DOD?  In general, there is no 
DOD policy or procedures for FSCP, however, there is a DOD policy for 
FSCAP that each Service follows. 
 
B. CONCLUSION 
• FSCP is the acquisition of flight safety parts. 
FSCP is a generic term used by DOD and the Services to 
cover the acquisition of flight safety parts, i.e., manufacture 
and post production of flight safety parts.  Although each 
Service has a unique term and policy for the procurement of 
flight safety parts, DOD does not have a common term and 
policy.  The term FSCP is used to cover the waterfront for the 
acquisition of FSCP when not being Service specific. 
 
• Using multiple terms for FSCP increases risk. 
Each Service has their own policy, which contains a unique 
term for the acquisition of FSCP.  The Army uses FSP, The 
Air Force uses EFSCAP, and FSCAP, the Navy uses CSI, and 
the JPPC uses EFSCAP, and there are subsets of each of 
these, i.e., CAI, FCI, DCP, etc.   
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DLA manages consumable and repairable FSCP for DOD.  
Each term has a quality level associated with it.  
Management of FSCP with multiple terms and quality 
requirements is difficult, and there is a risk associated with 
trying to satisfy many different engineering requirements for 
the same part. 
 
• There is no DOD qualification policy for FSCP. 
DOD does not have a policy that contains vendor 
qualification, and quality standards to ensure the 
procurement of high quality, proven, reliable, and safe FSCP.  
DOD 4140.1R is generic and applies to all military parts 
(except C6.5 FSCAP program).  DOD 4140.1R does not have 
the inspection criteria, or quality requirements needed to 
ensure the high standards required for FSCP.  DOD does 
have a Policy for FSCAP, which is documented in DOD 
4140.1R, C6.5.  The policy for FSCAP deals exclusively with 
the identification, documentation, and disposal of FSCAP. 
 
• Each Service manages FSCP differently 
Each Service manages the manufacture and post production 
of flight safety parts differently.  The Army has a formal 
program that relies on qualified sources for the procurement 
of FSP.  The Army allows breakout of FSP to manufacturers 
and vendors who pass the army qualification standards.  The 
Army requires Frozen process planning for FSP 
manufactures, and uses the SIOP and the FSP Program to 
monitor contractor performance. 
The Air Force does not have a formal program for the 
acquisition of FSCP.  The Air Force does not breakout FSCP.  
The Air Force procures FSCP from Prime contractors, the 
OEM, or OEM licensed vendors.  The Air Force exerts 
extensive process control over the prime contractors to 
ensure the quality of FSCP, but uses only limited production 
lot testing. 
The Navy has a formal program for CSI management.  The 
Navy limits potential new sources of CSI to those who have 
provided the same or similar items to the OEM or other 
military Services.  If a vendor has not produced a part in 3 
years, they must be requalified. 
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• FSCAP is the identification, control, and disposal of 
flight safety parts. 
The term FSCAP has a specific policy and definition tied to it.  
DOD 4140.1R, C6.5 FSCAP program address specifically the 
identification, control, and disposal requirements for FSCAP. 
• The DOD FSCAP policy is embraced by all three Services. 
All three Services reference and apply DOD 4140.1R, 
Chapter 6.5 FSCAP program in their flight safety parts 
program.  There are no changes needed. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
• Recommendation: Use the Term FSCAP to identify flight 
safety parts. 
When referring to flight safety parts, which term do you use, 
FSCP, FSCAP, FSP, CSI?  The term used for flight parts 
should give the vision of a reliable high quality part, not 
where on the lifecycle you are or what Service you are 
referring to.  When referring to flight safety parts there 
should be one distinct term.  A Common term with a 
common definition will eliminate confusion within the 
government and private industry, and one Term will unify 
the Services and support a common policy and definition. 
The term Flight Safety Critical Aircraft Parts (FSCAP) is 
already in the military system, i.e., Regulations, 
Publications, and government and contractor databases.  
FSCAP is descriptive of the intent of the flight safety parts 
program, i.e., the programs stress need for high quality in 
critical parts, and the program is specifically for aviation 
parts. 
 
• Recommendation: Use one definition and policy for 
flight safety parts. 
A Common definition and policy for flight safety parts should 
be used to eliminate confusion within the government and 
private industry.  The definition and policy for flight safety 
parts should cover the entire lifecycle, not just part of it.  
Although there are terminology differences between the 
Services, qualification methods and manufacturer approval 
processes are fundamentally the same.  Each Service 
evaluates supplier technical data to ensure it is current, 
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correct, and complete.  Each Service requires test articles to 
be submitted for engineering analysis to verify the item fully 
meets the approved design.  Each Service reviews supplier 
manufacturing processes, quality system, and configuration 
controls to ensure the supplier can repeatedly produce 
acceptable and safe items. 
 
• Recommendation: Use one Quality standard for 
procuring flight safety parts. 
A standard quality program will provide stable parts, and 
eliminate confusion when a vendor is producing a common 
part for all Services.  Although there are differences between 
each Services’ quality program they are fundamentally the 
same.  Each Service evaluates supplier technical data to 
ensure it is current, correct, and complete.  Each Service 
requires test articles be submitted for engineering analysis to 
verify the item fully meets the approved design.  Each 
Service reviews supplier manufacturing processes, quality 
system, and configuration controls to ensure the supplier 
can repeatedly produce acceptable and safe items. 
 
• Recommendation:  Develop one uniform DOD vendor 
qualification requirement. 
One uniform DOD vendor qualification requirement will 
establish one DOD face to private industry, and eliminate 
multiple requirements when a vendor is producing a 
common part for all Services.  Although there are differences 
between each Services vendor qualification requirements 
they are fundamentally the same.  Each Service requires the 
manufacture to pass FAT, establish a quality program, and 
an inspection and testing program.  Each Service exerts 
process control procedures on the manufacturer. 
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DEFINITIONS 
Critical Characteristic - Any feature throughout the life cycle of a FSCAP, 
such as dimension, tolerance, finish, material or assembly, 
manufacturing or inspection process, operation, field maintenance, or 
depot overhaul requirement that if non conforming, missing, or degraded 
may cause the failure or malfunction of the FSCAP. 
 
Dual Use Product/Part - Any product or part manufactured for civil 
application by Production Approval Holder (PAH) authorized by the FAA, 
which is also procured under U. S. military contract.  The product or 
part has the identical part number and configuration as its civil 
counterpart; it was manufactured using the same FAA-approved design, 
materials, and manufacturing processes.  These could also include any 
product (or part thereof) originally produced for the military, which 
currently holds a normal, utility, acrobatic, or transport type certificate 
(TC) issued under section 21.27 
 
Flight Safety Part - Any part, assembly, or installation containing a 
critical characteristic whose failure, malfunction, or absence could cause 
loss or serious damage to the aircraft, and/or serious injury or death to 
the occupants. 
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Installation Critical Characteristics - Critical characteristics that are not 
introduced during the manufacture of a part, but are critical in terms of 
assembly and/or installation, e.g., proper torque. 
 
Manufacturing Critical Characteristics - Critical characteristics produced 
during the manufacturing process. 
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